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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis presents research on corporate credit risk modeling tinder the New Basel Capital 
Accord framework using a real data set. This study provides theoretical foundations of credit risk 
modeling under the N e w Basel Capital Accord as well as empirical application of credit risk 
modeling to a unique data set of Czech companies provided by Creditreform. Several alternative 
logit regression models are presented, statistically tested and compared. Furthermore, two distinct 
approaches to calibration of rating classes of a rating system are developed and validated. Finally, 
the minimum regulatory capital requirements under the standardized approach and the internal 
ratings based approach of the New Basel Capital Accord are calculated and compared to the 
capital requirements under the current regulation. 
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A B S T R A K T 
Predkladana prace se zameruje na modelovani korporatm'ho uveroveho rizika s ohledem na Nova 
basilejska pravidla pro kapitalovou primerenost. Poskytuje jak teoreticke poznatky tak ukazku 
aplikace na unikatni'm realnem datovem souboru poskytnutem k temto ucelum spolecnosti 
Creditreform. Na zaklade techto dat jsou predstaveny logisticke modely, ktere jsou dale 
statisticky testovany a porovnavany. Nasledne jsou prezentovany a validovany dva rozdilne 
pri'stupy ke kalibraci jednotlivych tri'd ratingoveho modelu. V zaverecne casti prace jsou 
spocitany minimalm' kapitalove pozadavky a to die standardizovane metody a metody vnitrnich 
ratingu, ktere vychazeji ze zmmenych basilejskych pravidel. Tyto vysledky jsou pak 
porovnavany s kapitalovymi pozadavky vypoctenymi podle soucasnych pravidel. 
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1. Introduction 
In order to ensure increased added value to their stakeholders, banks enroll in various 
activities. Ranking high in the list, financial intermediation, i.e. borrowing money from 
depositors and lending money to different institutions, individuals and firms is one of most 
important activities of a bank. As banks play a central role in the economic system, 
regulation is necessary in order to prevent severe ruptures in the economic system. 
This regulation is achieved thanks to various instances and mechanisms. First of all, there is 
a nation wide regulation, where local banks are subject to a national regulator. Furthermore, 
in the past decades the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced 
worldwide regulatory suggestions with the aim to standardize the behavior of all 
internationally active banks. The Basel Capital Accord (also known as Basel 1) introduced 
in 1988 is now being replaced by the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) also known as 
Basel 11. In my thesis, I would like to elaborate on the latter, i.e. on the New Basel Capital 
Accord BCBS (2005a) that is nowadays being implemented by all major banks throughout 
the world. 
Among many other new things, the NBCA introduced new approaches to calculating 
regulatory capital for credit risk, as Basel I was often criticized for not taking the quality of 
banks ' credit portfolio into account. This caveat is overcome in the NBCA by the 
introduction of a whole new methodology to credit risk, the internal ratings based 
approach (IRB). Under this new approach, banks with good credit portfolio quality should 
benefit by holding less regulatory capital compared to the approach introduced in Basel I 
and only slightly modified in the standardized approach of the NBCA. However, the 
application of the IRB approach is more demanding for banks since it requires that they 
come up with their own models (rating systems) to assess the probability of default (PD) of 
their obligors. 
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In line with the Basel I, the NBCA works with segmentation of credit portfolio on 
sovereign, retail, corporate and so on. As the space constraints of this thesis do not allow 
focusing on all of these segments, I have chosen to limit myself to the last category. I will, 
therefore, devote my efforts to the clarification of banks' rating systems for corporate 
clients. 
The central hypothesis that I will try to prove empirically in this thesis is that the 1RB 
methodology brings benefits in the form of lower regulatory capital held for credit risk 
compared to the Basel I methodology and the standardized approach of the NBCA. 
There are several ways to achieve my goal. One of them would be the description and 
analysis of an existing internal rating system used for calculating the regulatory capital for 
credit risk by the 1RB approach. But this would prove difficult as banks do not openly share 
their systems and hence the background data would be impossible to retrieve. Therefore, 
amongst all possibilities, 1 have chosen to clarify the matter by trying to build (construct) a 
rating system of my own. This approach not only allows a deeper insight of the issue, but 
also reveals possible drawbacks and dead-ends that banks themselves may encounter when 
trying to set up the rating system on their own. 
The content of my thesis, as partially outlined above, entails some general overview of both 
of the Basel Capital Accords in the chapter 2. When describing the NBCA, emphasis is put 
on the first pillar that deals with capital requirements. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the detailed analysis of the internal ratings based approach. A 
precise description of the underlying model and methodology is presented along with 
theoretical arguments in favor of the 1RB approach over the standardized one. 
In the next chapter, the data set used in this thesis is presented. I had the chance to gel a 
large (and reliable) data set from Creditreform, a German company founded in 1879. Its 
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main task is to check the reliability of business partners of its clients in order to protect 
them from irrecoverable claims. As a data set is critical to setting up a valid rating system, 
data cleaning was carried out, a process which is thoroughly described in the chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 deals with the creation of the rating system itself and all the steps of the 
procedure are explained in detail. The core of the rating system is a logit regression model. 
Two alternative regression models are introduced, statistically tested and eventually the 
superior one is chosen. One of the next most important steps, which is setting up the rating 
classes, is performed in two alternative ways since there is no natural optimal solution. 
Hence, two alternative rating systems are created. 
After the rating systems are outlined, the next necessary step is the validation of the rating 
systems. Hence, the concept of discriminatory power is introduced in the chapter 6. Within 
the chapter, cumulative accuracy profile, followed by receh'er operating characteristics 
and conditional information entropy ratio are respectively outlined and used for validation 
o f t h e two rating systems, elaborated in the previous chapter. 
After the validation o f t h e rating systems, the next necessary step, their calibration, is also 
clarified in the chapter 6. Here, binomial and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests are utilized in order 
to check the sound calibration of the two rating systems. The results of the tests are 
compared and the better rating system is then chosen for calculating the capital 
requirements under the 1RB approach. 
The validated rating system is used to calculate the regulatory capital for credit risk. In 
chapter 7, the regulatory capital calculations according to the Basel 1 and the standardized 
and internal ratings based approach o f t h e NBCA are conducted. 
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and summarizes all findings. 
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The whole exercise of building an internal rating system is undertaken with the aim to 
understand and, hence, present the system of banks' internal mechanisms, used to control 
and mitigate credit risk. This analytical approach was chosen with the goal of applying the 
theoretical knowledge to real-life situations and understanding better internal bank 
procedures. 
Still, when compared to banks, the established model based on the Creditreform data 
disposes of one major advantage. Banks, when building their internal rating system only 
possess the information about clients to whom the money was actually lent. Therefore, 
concerning the clients that have been refused, the information about the capacity to pay 
back debt is missing in the system. As a result, the banks' data sample may not be 
completely accurate and faces a selection bias. Compared to this sample, the data I had at 
my disposition has a much larger scale. Therefore, the model set up in this thesis, should be 
able to discriminate much more accurately than systems used in banks and appears free o f 
this kind of selection bias. 
Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis was not advisory (i.e. to set up a better-than-bank's 
system) - its' only intent was to understand and present the internal ratings based approach 
per se. 
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2. Introduction to the New Basel Capital Accord 
In this chapter, the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) know also as Basel II is introduced. 
The chapter begins with an explanation about the theoretical background and the reasons 
for which banking regulation is necessary. Further on, the historical context and 
shortcomings of Basel I (predecessor of the NBCA) are described. The main focus of this 
chapter is the description of the there pillars of the NBCA, emphasis being put on pillar 1 
which deals with the minimal capital requirements. 
2.1. Regulation of banking system 
Three main reasons for capital regulation of financial institutions and banks in particular 
are widely mentioned in literature such as Pelizzon and Schaefer (2005), Saidenberg and 
Schuermann (2003) and Dierick et al. (2005) among others. The first reason stems from 
the asymmetric information, where we find depositors on one side and better-informed 
banks on the other. Here, the role of regulation is to protect depositors from exploitation by 
an opaque bank. 
The second reason is systemic risk. Banks are considered to be a source of systemic risk 
because o f the i r central role in the payments system and, more importantly, in the allocation 
of financial resources. Banking books are mostly composed of relatively short term 
liabilities (deposits) and relatively illiquid assets in the form of long term loans to firms and 
households. 
"Deposit insurance is designed to overcome the asymmetry of information in the banking 
system." (Saidenberg and Schuermann 2003, p.I) A bank is more aware than its depositors 
about its overall risk profile and exposure. Depositors are left with incomplete information 
and can, therefore, not distinguish a good bank from a bad one. They also know that banks 
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are highly leveraged institutions. If there was no deposit insurance, depositors would have a 
strong incentive to withdraw their funds in ease of even the slightest doubt about the 
financial health of a particular bank. Deposit insurance is, therefore, designed to prevent 
overreaction ofdepos i tors to bad news about banks and forms a safety net. 
Deposit insurance brings the benefit of overcoming the asymmetry of information, but 
comes at a cost. The cost here is moral hazard of depositors. They no longer have an 
incentive to monitor banks since they know that they will get their funds back lip to a 
certain coverage limit. Therefore, the presence of the safety net designed to prevent bank 
panic can lead to the moral hazard. The goal of banking regulation is to maintain balance 
between these two factors. 
Preventing systemic risk is also considered as fundamental rationale for imposing a 
regulation in the form of capital requirements on banks. "The assumption is that 
shareholders will not take account of the social costs of systemic risk in their capital 
decisions and so will tend to hold less capital than if these spillover costs were considered." 
(Saidenberg and Schuermann 2003, p.3) The minimal capital requirements imposed on 
banks are intended to ensure that shareholders of a bank have at least some minimal level of 
resources in order to honor their commitments to their customers. The banking business is 
one of the most indebted businesses in the world since banks borrow money from 
depositors and lend it to households or firms. Minimal capital requirements should ensure 
that owners of a bank do not engage in risky lending in order to make more profit. Since the 
money a bank lends does not belong to the owners but to the depositors, severe moral 
hazard o f t h e owners of a bank could emerge. 
Simply put, a bank is operating with money that does not belong to it. "Capital 
requirements are intended to mitigate moral hazard by ensuring that the owners of a 
financial institution have a stake in ensuring that the firm does not engage in fraud and 
conforms to conduct of business rules, if only to avoid fines or loss of equity value." 
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(Saidenberg and Schuermann 2003, p.4) In order for the capital requirements to be effective 
in this task, the capita! requirements must be sensitive to the risk exposure.1 
2.2. History of Basel I 
The early 1980's period was influenced by concerns about financial health of international 
banks and by complaints of unfair competition in the banking industry. Subsequently, The 
Basel Commit tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) initiated world wide discussion on the 
revision of capital standards. As a result, an agreement was reached in July 1988. 
The 1988 Basel Capital Accord, known as Basel I (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (1988)) was the first international accord of its kind. The Basel Capital Accord 
considered only crcdit risk" and was entirely focused on capital requirements. Basel 1 set 
minimum capital standards for internationally active banks. It was decided that the capital 
ratio would be 8 % of risk-weighted assets. ' 
Even though Basel 1 was major step towards international financial stability there were 
many criticisms of the accord. According to Stephanou and Mendoza (2005), one of the 
main criticisms of Basel I was its "one-size-fits-all" approach. 
1 Sens i t iv i ty o f the min ima l capital r equ i r emen t s to overal l risk exposure o f a bank is one o f the ma jo r 
i m p r o v e m e n t s o f the N B C A c o m p a r e d to Basel I. 
2 " R i s k o f losses in on and o f f -ba l ance sheet pos i t ions resul t ing from the fai lure o f a counterpar ty to perform 
a c c o r d i n g to a cont rac tua l a r r a n g e m e n t . " (Dier ick et al. 2005 , p .45 ) 
1 Base l I as wel l d e f i n e d the el igible regu la to ry capi ta l , assets subjec t to risk weight ing and the risk weight ing 
m e c h a n i s m . 
-9-
2.3. Shortcomings of Basel I 
In order to understand the international effort to come up with the NBCA it is important to 
comprehend the shortcomings of Basel I. Under Basel I, minimal capital requirements are 
only moderately related to a bank 's risk exposure. This fact is pointed out by Pelizzon and 
Schaefer (2005) among others. For example, capital requirement on a credit exposure does 
not differ according to the rating of the obligor. From the regulatory point of view there is 
no difference whether a bank has a credit exposure with an AAA rated company or with a 
C rated company. 
Saidenberg and Schuermann (2003) argue that this lack of risk sensitivity may distort 
economic decision making since economic capital'1 and regulatory capital3 are not in line. It 
can be more profitable for banks to optimize their portfolios in order to reduce regulatory 
capital requirements, rather than to optimize their overall risk exposure. Under Basel I, 
banks also have incentives for capital arbitrage through securitization, for example. 
Banks may also be reluctant to invest in better risk management since it can bring no 
regulatory capital benefits. Sound risk management is costly and, under Basel I, does not 
bring any benefits, so banks arc not motivated to invest in this area. 
2.4. The New Basle Capital Accord 
The N B C A aims to alleviate some o f t h e drawbacks o f t h e current Basle Capital Accord. 
The design of the NBCA is focused on better alignment between regulatory capital and 
4 "Cap i t a l held and a l located by the bank internal ly as a result o f its own assessment o f r isk. It can differ from 
regu la to ry capi ta l , w h i c h is de termined acco rd ing to superv i so ry rules." (Dier ick e t a l . , p. 45) 
5 " O w n funds that a re e l ig ible to meet the r egu la to ry capi tal requirements ; consis t of core capital and 
s u p p l e m e n t a r y capi ta l , a l ter a number o f deduc t ions . (Die r ick et al., p. 46 ) 
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underlying risks by encouraging better risk management practices in banks. By aligning 
regulatory capital more closely to a bank 's own risk estimates, the NBCA narrows the gap 
between regulatory and economic capital requirements. The NBCA is based on the three 
pillars approach. Pillar 1 focuses on minimal capital requirements, pillar 2 defines 
supervisory review of internal bank assessments of capital relative to risks and pillar 3 
increases public disclosure of risks and capital information sufficient to provide meaningful 
market discipline. 
All these pillars are important and self enforcing. "It is significant that for the first time in 
international capital regulation, supervision and market discipline are placed at the same 
point in hierarchy as the regulatory minimum." (Pelizzon and Schaefer 2005, p.7) 
Overview o f t h e N e w Framework is graphically represented on Picture 1 below. 
Picture 1 





Source: D i e r i c k e t a l . (2005) 
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2.5. Pillar f 
In accordance with the theory of asymmetry of information , pillar 1 provides a menu based 
approach to credit risk, rather than a uniform "one-size-fits-all" rule. 
The minimum capital ratio of 8% remains unchanged. "This ratio expresses the relationship 
between the bank's regulatory own funds (capital) and its risk weighted assets, a measure 
of the risk it incurs." (Dierick et al. 2005, p.9) However, the computation of capital 
requirement has changed substantially. The denominator represents the fundamental 
changes induced by the NBCA. The numerator in the formula, i.e. what counts toward 
eligible capital remains unchanged compared to Basel I. 
. , Eligible capital 
Capital ratio = 
Credit risk + Market risk + Operational risk 
The approach to the calculation of credit risk has completely changed since it is defined as 
the sum of risk weighted assets. Capital charge for operational risk is introduced as a new 
risk category. The market risk fraction remains basically unchanged.8 
As this thesis is focused on credit risk only, operational and market risks are not considered 
further in this work. 
6 As this thesis is conce rned with credit risk o f co rpo ra t e exposures , c la ims on sovere ign , banks and retail are 
not c o v e r e d . 
7 Ind iv idua l b a n k s have more and bet ter in fo rmat ion about risks they face than an international regulatory 
body . 
8 T h e marke t risk w a s introduced to Base l I in 1996 when the Basel Capital Accord underwent a ma jor 
a m e n d m e n t . 
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2.6. Credit Risk under Pillar 1 
The NBCA reflects the development of credit risk management practices in the financial 
industry, and pillar I introduces a range of approaches for credit risk assessment. These are 
the standardized and the internal ratings based (IRB) approaches. The IRB methodology 
has two subsequent versions - foundation and advanced. 
2.6.1. Standardized Approach 
Changes in the standardized approach are modest compared to Basel I. They incorporate 
risk sensitivities through observable risks measures such as external credit ratings. 
However, there are several criteria that rating agencies must satisfy in order to be 
recognized by the banking supervisor as eligible to provide banks with ratings. 
Under the standardized approach, exposures are classified into a set of standardized asset 
classes as depicted on Picture 2. A risk weight is applied to each class reflecting the relative 
amount of credit risk. 
Picture 2 
Source: Dierick et al. (2005) 
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Whereas Basel I assigned 100% risk weight to all corporate exposures, the NBCA offers 
considerable different ia t ion in the risk weights according to external ratings. See Picture 3 
be low. 
Picture 3 
Credit assessment AAA to 
AA-
A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below 
BB-
Unrated 
Risk weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Source: B C B S (2005a) 
Hence , even the calculat ion o f capital requirements by the standardized approach can bring 
benefi ts if a credi t portfol io is o f a good quality. Nevertheless, obtaining a rating from a 
recognized rat ing agency is costly. It can be expected that for many small and medium 
compan ie s the cos t of obtaining a rating would exceed the benefits. Hence, when providing 
a credit to these companies , in most cases the 100% risk weight will have to be assigned. 
2.6.2. Internal Ratings Based Approach9 
T h e 1RB approach is fundamenta l ly d i f ferent from the Basel 1 methodology in concept, 
des ign and implementat ion. The aim is to create correct incentives for both banks and 
regulators . An extensive effort is expected from banks in order to develop their internal 
ratings models . These models will provide banks with estimates of the probability of 
default (PD) of their obligors as the PDs are one of the most important inputs into the 
capital requirements funct ion. 
T h e IRB approach has two versions; these are the foundation approach and the advanced 
approach . The d i f fe rence between the two is the extent of internal information of banks 
" T h e IRB approach is desc r ibed in grea ter detail in chap te r 3. 
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used in the calculation of the capital requirements. In the foundation approach, only PD 
may be estimated internally, subject to supervisory review (as defined in pillar 2). Loss 
given default and maturity adjustment is fixed and provided by the regulator. Under the 
advanced approach, all parameters are determined internally and are subject to supervisory 
review10 . 
On the regulatory side, an extensive effort is also necessary. The national regulator needs to 
approve and validate rating models of individual banks to ensure that the models are NBCA 
compliant and appropriate for regulatory capital computations. 
2.7. Pillar 2 and 3 
Pillar 2 is considered to be an essential element of the NBCA since it promotes the 
supervisory review process and expects an active role of supervisors. Banks are encouraged 
to develop internal economic capital assessments in line with their risk profiles for 
identifying, measuring and controlling risks. The fact that any rule based approach will 
inevitably lag behind changes in risk profiles of banks is recognized by emphasis on the 
internal assessments of capital adequacy. 
Hence, it is the task of the supervisors to analyze whether a specific bank's capital 
adequacy assessment is in line with its overall risk profile and business strategy. 
Supervisors also review if a bank should not hold additional capital against risks that are 
not (or not fully) covered in pillar 1. "Relative to the present situation, pillar 2 requires 
supervisors to apply considerably more discretion in their assessment of capital adequacy in 
individual banks." (Dierick et al. 2005, p. 18) Pillar 2, therefore, provides a basis for 
supervisory intervention to prevent unwarranted decline in a bank's capital. 
10 T o be able to use the advanced IRB approach a mode l for the loss given defaul t ( L G D ) is necessary. 
M o d e l i n g L G D is b e y o n d the scopc o f this thesis. Consequen t ly , only the foundat ion IRB is considered 
fur ther on in this thes is . 
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Pillar 3 reflects the effort o f t h e Basel Committee to promote market discipline through 
greater transparency and improved disclosure of banks across markets. By promoting 
transparency, pillar 3 attempts to capture the benefits of market discipline. The idea is for 
banks to tell market participants key parameters of their risk measures, risk management 
and business profile. For the disclosure of credit risk in particular, portfolio structure, major 
types of credit exposures and geographical and sectoral distribution should be published. 
The market ' s judgment of capital adequacy will influence the banks' share price and access 
to funding. Therefore, pillar 3 should improve market discipline on banks. 
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3. Internal Ratings Based Approach 
The internal ratings based approach to credit risk represents one o f t h e major innovations in 
the NBCA. This chapter is devoted to the detailed description of the IRB approach. The 
formula for computation of capital requirements using the IRB approach is presented as 
well as the underlying model and methodology the formula is based on. 
1 would also like to argue why it is beneficial for banks to adopt the IRB approach instead 
of the standardized one. The argumentation presented in the second part of this chapter is 
purely of theoretical nature. In later chapters, empirical study is concluded in order to prove 
the central hypothesis of this thesis, i.e. that adopting the IRB approach yields lower 
regulatory capital than the standardized approach. 
3.1. Description of the IRB Approach 
Possible losses from a credit portfolio can be separated in two: the expected loss and the 
unexpected loss. Banks are expected to cover for the former themselves, whereas regulatory 
capital stands as a cushion against the latter. 
"Although credit losses naturally fluctuate over time and with economic conditions, there is 
(ceteris paribus) a statistically measured, long-run average loss level." (Stephanou and 
Mendoza 2005, p.6) For a single exposure, the expected loss (EL) can be estimated as 
fo l lows" : 
EL=PD*LGD*EAD. 
" Descr ip t ion o f these abbrev ia t ions can b e found on p a g e 19. 
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The expected loss from a whole portfolio is then simply the sum of expected losses of the 
single exposures. 
Note that expected losses do not represent risks from a credit portfolio. They should be 
viewed as the cost of doing business, and capital requirements are not designed to cover 
expected losses. Banks have to cover their expected losses through pricing, provisions and 
write-offs. 
The regulatory capital requirement is designed to cover for unexpected loss. The 
unexpected loss is simply the standard deviation of the expected loss. For illustration see 








EL / \ • / \ p \ 
(Mean) i > \ » i \ 
• y * \ • • • 
i / • / 
TIME 
Source: Stephanou and Mendoza (2005) 
The IRB approach is, in fact, designed to model the variance of losses from a credit 
portfolio. To achieve this goal, the IRB approach is based on the Value at Risk (VaR) 
methodology1 2 and the key parameters used to estimate credit risk are the following: 
12 For de ta i l s on the V a R m e t h o d o l o g y see a p p e n d i x I . 
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PD the probability of default of an obligor over a one year horizon, 
LGD the loss given default as a percentage of exposure at default13, 
EAD exposure at default, the nominal amount ofcredit1 4 , 
M maturity. 
For the foundation IRB, only the PD can be assessed internally by banks. The LGD and M 
are set by the supervisor. "The IRB at heart provides continuous mapping from basic set of 
four inputs parameters (PD, LGD, EAD and M), plus some other observables such as 
borrower type, to a minimum capital requirement."(Saidenberg and Schuermann 2003, p.9) 
The theoretical basis o f t h e IRB model is the asymptotic single risk factor (ASRF) model. 
As in many other credit risk models, the probability of a borrower being unable to repay his 
loan is derived from the distance between the value of its assets and the nominal amount of 
his debt. "The value o f t h e f irm's assets is modeled as a variable which changes over time, 
in part as a result of the impact of random shocks." (Dierick et al. 2005, p.12) Default 
occurs when the modeled value of an obligor 's assets falls below the amount of outstanding 
debt. Credit risk is then measured by PD over one year time horizon. 
The ASRF model does not take into account obligors' specific risks. These idiosyncratic 
risks can be diversified away in a large loan portfolio. Hence, the model assumes that banks 
have large and well diversified portfolios because it measures only the marginal risk 
contribution of an exposure to such a portfolio. In this well diversified portfolio, every 
obligor accounts for only a very small share of the total portfolio exposure. Such a portfolio 
is also well diversified across geographical areas and industry sectors in a large economy. !> 
13 T h e pa r ag raph 2 8 7 o f t h e N B C A ( B C B S 2 0 0 5 a ) sugges t s the L G D to b e equal to 4 5 % . This va lue of L G D 
is cons idered t h rough out this thesis. 
14 By de f in i t i on , the E A D is a lways known by banks . 
15 It is p r o b a b l e that these a s sumpt ions will not b e met , for example , by banks special izing in lending to a 
par t icular industr ial sec tor . " H e n c e , under pillar 2, supe rv i so r s will analyze potential risk concentrat ions and 
m a y poten t ia l ly d e v e l o p appropr ia te pillar 2 capital b u f f e r s against such risk concent ra t ions ." (Dierick et al. 
2 0 0 5 , p. 19) 
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"The IRB approach therefore contains a deliberate simplification compared with the most 
advanced techniques currently applied." (Dierick et al. 2005, p. 12) 
For corporate exposures, the capital charge is equal to: 
Capital requirement = 8% * RWA 
The risk weighted assets (RWA) are computed according to the following formula: 
RWA = K(PD, LGD, M) * 12.5 * EAD 
where 12.5 is the reciprocal of 8% (the overall level of minimum capital as percentage of 
RWA). As with the expected loss, all calculations are done at exposure level. Total 
portfolio capital is then the sum of all exposure level capital charges. 
The mapping function AT has the following form: 
K= LGD*® (1 -p)-0'5 *<D-'(/>£>)-
/ 
J L 
l - p 





p = 0.12*A + 0 . 2 4 * ( l - A ) 
1 „ ( - 5 ( W J ) 
A = -
[ - e ( _ 5 0 ) 
b = (0.11852 - 0.05478 * In (PD)) 1 . 
<t>(.) stands for the standard normal cumulative distribution function; p is a weighted 
correlation parameter with weight A determined by PD and b is a maturity adjustment. The 
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implied correlation p among particular exposures is a weighted average between 12% and 
24%. 
When taking a closer look on the equations stated above, several interesting characteristics 
can be revealed. First of all, the correlation of losses16 from single exposures is included, 
but modeled only as a function of PD. Hence, the IRB approach ignores potentially 
important portfolio characteristics such as geographical and industrial concentration. It is 
the task of the national regulator to decide whether diversification in the portfolio is 
sufficient to comply with the assumptions of the IRB model. If it is not the case, the 
national regulator may, under pillar 2, request increase of regulatory capital. 
Secondly, maturity adjustment Ml is introduced to cope with potential credit quality 
deterioration of exposures with longer maturities. The NBCA suggest the average maturity 
to be 2.5 years. Exposures with shorter maturities are favored whereas exposures with 
longer maturities are penalized. 
Thirdly, the function K is set up in such a way that a bank's regulatory capital should cover 
unexpected losses with probability 99.9% over a one year horizon. Thus, it can be said that 
there is one in 1 000 chance that a bank 's losses from a credit portfolio over one year will 
exceed the minimum regulatory capital. 
Finally, the IRB approach distinguishes between expected and unexpected losses from a 
credit portfolio. "Under the IRB approach, banks will need to compare the amount of total 
eligible provisions [ . . . ] with total estimated EL." (Stephanou and Mendoza 2005, p. 20) If 
the expected loss exceeds the total eligible provisions then banks have to deduct the 
difference from the regulatory capital. If the opposite is tnie, i.e. total eligible provisions 
16 N o t e that there is a paral lel with the por t fo l io theory under ly ing the C A P M model k n o w from finance. T h e 
s tandard dev ia t ion o f total credit portfol io depends on pair correlat ions o f all exposures in the portfol io. 
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exceed the expected loss, then banks may recognize the difference in the regulatory capital 
up to a certain limit. 
3.2. Advantages of the IRB Approach 
Under the NBCA, banks are free to choose whether they will adopt the IRB approach or 
whether they will use the standardized approach. Adopting the IRB approach allows banks 
to use their own models to assess creditworthiness (PDs) of their customers. In the 
following paragraphs, I would like to present reasons why it is beneficial for banks to adopt 
the IRB approach. 
First of all, Schwaiger (2003) argues that internationally active banks with well diversified 
portfolios of good quality should benefit from the IRB approach by holding less regulatory 
capital. Secondly, as pointed out by Dierick et al. (2005), the IRB approach allows banks to 
align their economic and regulatory capital. Thirdly, the decision not to adopt the IRB 
approach could lead to loss of prestige in the banking community and finally, if a majority 
of banks on a particular market adopts the IRB approach then rest of the banks would have 
to follow. Therefore, it can be expected that banks will develop their credit rating systems 
and adopt the IRB approach to calculate the amount of regulatory capital for credit risk. 
The main task for banks before adopting the IRB, is to develop credit rating systems that 
are statistically powerful. With powerful rating systems, banks will be able to differentiate 
"good" potential borrowers from "bad" ones, thus overcoming the asymmetry of 
information. A potential borrower always has more information regarding its ability to 
repay a loan. The analysis of a borrower's quantitative and qualitative information using a 
rating system allows a bank's risk analyst to make a better decision whether to grant the 
loan or not. 
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The Adverse selection is also connected with asymmetry of information. „In competitive 
framework a poor statistical power of a bank's internal rating system will deteriorate the 
economic performance due to adverse selection, i.e. customers with a better credit quality 
than assesses by the bank will potentially walk away and leave the bank with portfolio of 
customers with a credit quality lower than estimated" (Schwaiger et al. 2004, p.2) Hence, 
customers with good rating quality will take credit from a bank with more powerful rating 
system that can assess their creditworthiness better. Such a bank can, subsequently, offer 
these customers better tenns on loans. A bank with a less powerful rating system will be 
left with "bad" customers who know about their low credit quality. 
Now that the theoretical foundations of the IRB approach were described, 1 can turn to the 
empirical pail of this thesis. In the following chapters, I will try to prove the central 
hypothesis of lower regulatory capital requirements under the IRB approach compared to 
the Basel I methodology and the standardized approach o f t h e NBCA. 
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4. Data 
In order to prove the central hypothesis of this thesis a valid data set is necessary. This 
chapter is therefore dedicated to the description o f t h e data set that is used throughout this 
thesis. First, the data source is mentioned. Secondly, documentation regarding the 
necessary cleaning of the data is presented. Thirdly, various descriptive characteristics of 
the data set are mentioned. 
4.1. Data source - Creditreform 
The data for this thesis was obtained from Creditreform, a German company founded in 
1879. Its main task is to check the reliability of business partners of its clients in order to 
protect them from irrecoverable claims. The Czech branch of Creditreform was established 
in 1890, closed in 1948 and then reestablished in I99l . 
Amongst many other business activities, Creditreform computes solvency index for Czech 
companies. This index can be viewed as a measure of trustworthiness. The main advantage 
of this solvency index is that it provides a long history of stable data for a large number of 
companies. 
4.1.1. Computation ofthe Solvency Index 
The solvency index embodies 15 aspects of relevant business information and is based on a 
precise mathematical formula. Table I below shows all the information used in order to set 
up the solvency index. 
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Table 1 
1 mode of payments 9 payment moral of customers 
2 credit judgment 10 payment moral 
3 order book situation 11 capital turnover 
4 business expansion / development 12 legal form 
5 number of employees 13 age of company 
6 turnover / overall performance 14 shareholder structure 
7 productivity / turnover per employee 15 business sector conditions 
8 equity 
Source: www.credi t refonn.cz 
This information is then aggregated and the relative weights of all information categories 
are summarized in the following ' fable 2. An example of a solvency index calculation can 
be found in appendix 2. 
Table 2 
turnover information / financial data 25% 
credit judgment 25% 
mode of payments 20% 
structural data 15% 
industry and size 15% 
Source: www.c red i t re fo rm.cz 
The range of the solvency index spans from 100 to 600 risk, points, 100 risk points 
representing the most trustworthy entrepreneurships. The index is a continuous scale from 
100 to 500 points followed by a stand alone category of 600 risk points. The 600 risk points 
represent the legal default. 
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4.2. Data cleaning 
The data pool obtained from Creditreform contained observations for 85 169 companies 
with a time span from 1998 to 2005. The data was ordered into a matrix D, D = (index n), 
where z = l..m,j = l..n and m = 85 169, n = 8 (m being the number of companies, n 
representing years from 1998 to 2005). 
As mentioned, the data set I have obtained from Creditreform is comprehensible, fairly 
large and reliable. Nevertheless, due to various reasons, some data points for particular 
years and / or firms were missing. Hence, 1 have faced a bias whether to work with all (and 
incomplete) data or limit myself to use of data which are thoroughly complete only. As 
both ways are feasible and yield sound results in a particular context, they could be both, 
under certain circumstances, employed in this thesis. Hence, my choice could be basically 
deliberate. Moreover, as the data pool was large enough, I have chosen the latter method, 
i.e. to nairow down the data pool and use only the complete data. This method is also in 
line with Kuhn (1977) who advised to work rather with smaller and more reliable pool than 
vice versa. 
Hence, excessive cleaning of the data set was carried out due to missing observations for 
particular companies for certain years; companies that entered the data pool with 600 risk 
points and so on. Not cleaning the data pool would inflict severe statistical noise. The 
cleaning criteria were set up as follows: 
• No reestablishment of a defaulted company - once a company received 600 or 50017 
risk points it is considered "dead"18 and later observations are not taken into 
account. 
17 For detai ls for the se t t ing o f defaul t threshold see chap te r 5.1.1. 
18 In line wi th other l i tera ture in this f ield, such as Lando and Skodeberg (2002) and Schuermann and Hanson 
(2004) , the defaul t c lass is cons idered all c o n s u m i n g . Hence , once a c o m p a n y defaul t s no later observations 
are cons ide red . 
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• More than one consecutive observation per company - since transitions from one 
year to another are needed for creating a rating system. 
• Deletion of all observations for year 2005, since the data was not complete at the 
t ime o f t h e elaboration of this thesis. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to set up a sound rating system that will provide 
probabilities of default. In order to do so, the solvency indices in year t and year t + 1 are 
necessary to estimate the PDs. Thus, it is necessary to have two or more consecutive 
observations per company. 
All 2005 solvency indices were not complete at the time o f t h e writing of this thesis. Using 
only the available indices could cause a bias in the calibration o f t h e rating system. One can 
expect that big and well know companies were researched and entered into the database 
first. Also companies on the brink of bankruptcy would be one o f t h e first in the database. 
If the 2005 observations were left in the data pool, severe statistical noise would be 
inflicted. 
Application of these three criteria reduced the number of rows in the matrix D to 16 363. 
More than three quarters o f t h e observations did not pass the cleaning and had to be deleted 
since they brought no useful information for a rating system construction. Following and 
combining of the cleaning criteria led to the deletion of companies that were new to the 
database in 2004 and 2005 because there was no transition for these companies. Also, 
companies that had either 600 or 500 risk points or no value at all were deleted. There were 
also companies that entered the database in year 1998 as defaulted and were, therefore, 
deleted from the data set1". Flowever, the highest number of companies was deleted because 
there was only one observation for them. 
19 Th i s cletuiing resul ted in defaul t rate equal to zero for the year 1998. 
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4.3. Data description 
All obligors in the data set are Czech companies. The cleaned sample contains 16 363 
companies with the total number of observations reaching 53 489 and covering a time span 
of 7 years (1998-2004). 
Graph I shows that the observations are rather uniformly distributed over the years with a 
peak in 2000. Defaults are rather uniformly distributed as well with the exception in 2001. 
The default rate stays below 4% for all years except 2001. 
Graph 
Distribution of companies and defaults 




Companies (left axis) Defaults (left axis) —m— Default rate (right axis) 
One can easily calculate that the 53 489 observations in our sample represent about 47% of 
all possible observations if every company was assigned an index every year. For 9 285 
companies the data pool contained only two consecutive observations, while for 8 317 
companies multiple consecutive observations at different points in time were available. The 
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Graph 3 shows the dispersion of indices within ranges. Almost half of the sample is located 
within the 250 - 299 range. The data sample has a clear bell shaped distribution where 



















n 0.4% 0,0% 0.4% 3.4% 
100-149 150-199 200-249 250-299 300-349 350-399 400-449 450-499 500 
Index range 
T h e fact that there are no companies with index values 450-499 was on o f t h e reasons for including the 
stand alone 5 0 0 class in the defaul t category. The discussion o f setting the default threshold is presented in 
chapter 5.1.1. 
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It is also noteworthy that there appears to be no clear trend in the median Creditrefonn 
solvency index. Thus , we can conclude that there is no observable improvement in the 
credit quality o f t h e data sample. 
Graph 4 
We can see that the data set is rather large and has reasonable characteristics. Therefore, it 
is possible to build a valid rating system with this data sample, one that can be used to 
provide PDs for computation o f t h e minimal capital requirements using the IRB approach. 
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5. Rating system 
There exist many approaches to creating a rating system that are widely discussed in 
academic literature. If one works with a data set of rated companies, then it is possible to 
follow the so called cohort (historical) approach as in Lando and Skodeberg (2002), 
Schuermann and Jafry (2003) and Kadlcakova and Keplinger (2004). Ratings can also be 
modeled according to Markow chains as described in Lando and Skodeberg (2002). 
Probabilities of default are then computed according to rating migrations of rated 
companies. 
In the event that companies in the data set are not rated, it is necessary to use a regression 
model where financial ratios are used as independent variables and the dependent variable 
marks either default or non default. This approach is used in Femandes (2005). 
The data set used in this thesis allows for both approaches. The Creditreforin solvency 
index can be viewed as 400 + I21 ratings. Then it would be possible to use the cohort 
approach to set up rating classes and assign a PD to every class. The other possibility would 
be to use the solvency index in a single factor regression model and assign a PD to every 
index value. Subsequently, rating classes would be set up and PD of every class would 
equal the expected PD o f t h e rating class. 
Since this thesis is focused on the application o f t h e IRB approach in the banking industry, 
the regression model approach was selected. Building a rating system is the main task that 
banks willing to adopt internal ratings based approach must undertake. Since most of a 
bank ' s obligors are privately held firms with no market data available, banks will probably 
adopt accounting based credit scoring models. 
21 T h e s o l v e n c y index has a r ange f rom 100 to 500 risk points p lus stand a lone 6 0 0 risk points. For details see 
chap te r 4. 
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To set up such a model, banks need a history of accounting statements of their clients as 
well as their delinquency history. Variety of financial ratios can be calculated from the 
accounting statements and these can be used as inputs to a quantitative model. The model 
can be a regression model where the delinquency information is used as a dependent 
variable and the financial ratios as independent variables. 
However, all banks, by definition, face a selection bias. Banks can consider the behavior of 
accepted loans only. There is no way a bank can know what would happen to an obligor it 
rejected, if it would default or not"2. Hence, rating models of all banks are affected by such 
a bias. 
The advantage o f my rating system is that it is not affected by such a bias, because the data 
set comes from an external company. Therefore, ceteris paribus, my rating system should 
provide more accurate results and overcome the selection bias. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, a quantitative regression model is 
presented along with the discussion about setting the default threshold and description of 
the regression data set. An alternative regression model using additional information about 
the regional division of companies is also introduced. Several statistical tests are applied in 
order to distinguish which model better fits the underlying data set. 
Secondly, the results o f t h e quantitative model are used for calibration o f t h e rating system, 
i.e. setting rating classes. Since there is no natural solution to the calibration problem two 
different calibrations are described and subsequently two rating systems are constructed. 
22 W h e n dec id ing a b o u t grant ing a loan banks can m a k e two types o f error. The first error is rejecting a loan 
to an ob l igor that w o u l d not subsequent ly defaul t . T h e cost for the bank coming from this error is the cost o f 
f o r e g o n e bus iness , i.e. the m o n e y the bank could h a v e m a d e if it had provided the loan. T h e second error 
h a p p e n s w h e n a bank gran ts a loan to an obl igor that subsequen t ly defaul ts . The cost here is lost interest and 
pr inc ipal . 
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5.1. Quantitative model 
The binary logit regression model is used as the quantitative model underlying the rating 
system built in this thesis. The model will assign each firm its individual probability of 
default. These individual PDs will later be used to classify firms into rating classes and to 
assign a probability of default to each one of these rating classes. 
Such a purely quantitative rating system is not compliant with the NBCA because o f t h e 
absence of human judgment . "Credit scoring models and other mechanical procedures are 
permissible as the primary or partial basis of rating assignments, and may play a role in the 
estimation of loss characteristics. Sufficient human judgment and human oversight is 
necessary to ensure that all relevant and material information, including that which is 
outside the scope of the model, is also taken into consideration, and that the model is used 
appropriately." (BCBS 2005a, par. 417) 
However , the methodology applied in this thesis can be used as a building block for a 
compliant system. 
5.1.1. Setting the default threshold 
The first task when building the quantitative model is to decide on the value of the 
Creditreform index that would indicate default. According to paragraph 452 in the NBCA 
(2005) document: "A default is considered to have occurred with regard to a particular 
obligor when the obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation to 
the banking group." The problem here is that the NBCA definition of default is of financial 
nature whereas the Creditreform solvency index value 600 stands for legal default, i.e. 
bankruptcy. 
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The analysis in chapter 4 and the fact that the index value of 600 means legal default and 
the value of 500 means serious financial difficulties motivated my decision to set the 
default solvency index value to 499. This definition of default corresponds to one used in 
Kadlcakova and Keplinger (2004). 
5.1.2. Creating the data set for regression 
A regression matrix was created according to previous discussions about the setting o f t h e 
default threshold. In the first column o f t h e matrix were the non defaulting Creditrefonn 
solvency indices (CRPO) for year t; the third column being filled by corresponding indices 
lor year t + 1. The default variable D was constructed in the middle column 
( D = 0 if CRPO 1+1 <500 and D=1 i fCR t + l > 5 0 0 ) . The matrix is therefore a matrix of all 
transition pairs obtained from the cleaned data pool. The total number of transitions is 
34 384. 
With the default definition and the regression data set at hand, it is possible to turn to 
econometric modeling. 
5.1.3. The model 
The quantitative model underlying the rating system has the following general form: 
Y,=mCRFO,) + e,. 
The dependent variable Y is the binary variable that takes value l if the company has 
defaulted at time t + I and 0 otherwise. Since we are concerned with one year PDs, variable 
C R F O is the value o f t h e Creditreform index at time t, i.e. one year before the evaluation of 
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the dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, the logit model is the selected functional 
form23 . 
The regression equation has the following fonn: 
Y^fa+PSCRFO,. 
The results of the logit regression are presented in Table 3 below: 
Table 3 
Estimate Standard error 
Wald 
statistics p-value 
Po 6.583277 0.176426 1392.392 0.00 
Pi -0.012262
24 0.000580 447.337 0.00 
In the following paragraphs, the results as well as assumptions o f t h e model will be subject 
to statistical tests (Wald test, Davidson and McKinnon test, Box-Tidwell test and Hosiner-
Lemeshow test) in order to ensure the validity and robustness o f the regression model. 
The significance of each estimated coefficient was tested using the Wald test. Both 
coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level. 
In order to ensure a meaningful application of the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
measures, it is necessary to verify the robustness o f t h e regression model. Since most o f t he 
problems for robustness of a logit model stem from heteroskedasticitv, the statistical test of 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) is applied. The hypothesis H0 of homoskedasticity 
against Hi of heteroskedasticity is tested. 
2 ! For detai ls see a p p e n d i x 3 . 
24 T h e nega t ive s ign o f the C R F O coef f ic ien t s t e m s from the fact that the statistical package used to est imate 
the mode l e s t ima tes the probabil i ty o f non defau l t s . Hence , the higher the C R F O is the lower the odds of not 
de f au l t i ng ( the h igher the probabil i ty o f defau l t ing) . 
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Since t h e j 2 test statistic is equal to 7.05 with the*2distribution with one degree of 
freedom at the 95% confidence level being 3.84, Ho is rejected in favor of H,. Therefore, 
this model setup is not robust, thus resulting in inconsistencies in the estimated coefficients. 
Moreover, the assumption of linearity between the CRFO variable and the logit of the 
dependent variable was checked using the Box-Tidwell test. It turned out that there is a 
serious non-linear relationship. The true relationship was adequately captured using the 
fractional polynomial methodology. The revisited regression equation then takes the 
following form: 
Y,=Po + P\* CRFO*, 







Po 4.792372 0.089508 2866.679 0.00 
p1 -0.000020 0.000001 491.382 0.00 
Both coefficients are still significant at the 9 i % significance level and there is no evidence 
of non-1 inear re lationsh ip. 
In this case the H0 of homoskedasticity cannot be dismissed. T h e ^ 2 test statistic is equal to 
3.25 with the x* distribution with one degree of freedom at the 95% confidence level being 
3.84. Therefore, this model is robust. 
The goodness-of-fit of the corrected model was checked by the Hosmer-Lenieshow test. 
The Chi-square value o f t h e test is 14.7 and corresponding p-value 0.06. Thus, we cannot 
-36-
reject the H0 of good model tit at the 95% significance level. Perhaps, the results o f t h e 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test will appear more clearly on the following Graph 5. 
Graph 5 
The observed and expected defaults are plotted for each decile. We conclude that this 
estimated logit regression significantly fits the observed data. The following Graph 6 shows 
the probabilities of default that the quantitative model assigns to each value of the 
Creditreform solvency index. 
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Graph 6 
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The presented regression model passed all the necessary tests and can therefore be used as 
the underlying model for a rating system. However, the Creditreform data pool contained 
additional information that could be used in the regression. To check whether the additional 
information brings added value is the subject o f t h e following chapter. 
5.1.4. The model - an alternative 
The Creditreform data set also contains the ZIP code of every company. Thus, it is possible 
to differentiate companies into 7 regions of the Czech Republic2 ' . Moreover, Creditreform 
does not take into account the regional effects when calculating the solvency index. Since it 
25 T h e s e reg ions are: Prague , Central Bohemia , Wes te rn / Southern Bohemia , Nor thern Bohemia, Eastern 
B o h e m i a , Sou thern M o r a v i a and Nor thern Morav ia . 
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is possible to use the regional information through dummy variables in a logit model, an 
alternative logit model was set up to try to make use of the regional information. 
The regression equation has the following form: 
Y, = ft * CRFO, + ft * R1 + ft * R2 + ft * R3 + ft * R4 + ft, * RS + ft * R6 + ft * R 7 
Where R/,...,R7 are regional dummy variables assuming value 1 if a company is from the 
same region and 0 if otherwise. Note that there is no intercept in this regression equation. 
The reason is that since the dummy variables are mutually exclusive the intercept can be 
expressed as a linear combination of the dummy variables. If the intercept was left in the 
equation perfect collinearity between the intercept and the dummy variables would be 
obtained, resulting in an ill specified model. 
The results o f t h e logit regression are presented in Table 5 below: 
Table 5 




Pi -0.011388 0.000579 386.718 0.00 
p2 6.231293 0.176396 1247.893 0.00 
p3 6.512526 0.192545 1144.018 0.00 
P4 6.361327 0.190155 1119.129 0.00 
P5 6.410346 0.197890 1049.334 0.00 
Pe 6.340169 0.187973 1137.657 0.00 
P? 6.346346 0.190121 1114.266 0.00 
Pa 6.240089 0.184975 1138.041 0.00 
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As in ihe previous model setup, the significance of each estimated coefficient was tested 
using the Wald test. All coefficients are significant at the 95% significance level. Moreover, 
the joint significance of the region dummies was tested by means o f t h e joint Wald test. 
The X ' statistic yields 1328.7, with the critical value of t h e ^ 2 distribution with seven 
degrees of freedom at the 95% significance level being 14.07; this implies that the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of all regional dummies are 0 can be rejected. 
The Davidson and MacKinnon test was also applied in this alternative model setup. The 
results show that the Ho of homoskedasticity can be rejected since t h e ^ 2 test statistic is 
equal to 129.08 with the distribution with eight degrees of freedom at the 95% 
confidence level being 15.5. Therefore, the alternative model setup is not robust, resulting 
in inconsistencies in the estimated coefficients. 
Applying the Box-Tidwell test did not show any sign of a non-linear relationship in this 
model setup. 
The alternative model is not robust (as shown by the Davidson and McKinnon test) and no 
immediate remedy is available"*'. Therefore, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test was not applied 
since it is not possible to ensure meaningful results o f t h e test. 
Hence, the main model specification represents the best model in terms of robustness and 
significance of the independent variable. Therefore, the main model is used to set up the 
rating system and the region information is not taken into account. 
2 6 Fur the r research o f this model se tup would need to be concluded. However , that is beyond the scope o f this 
thes is . 
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5.2. Calibration 
With the regression model in place, the next necessary step is to set up the rating classes, 
i.e. to find thresholds that would determine the rating classes. 
First, it is necessary to determine how many rating classes the rating system should have. 
According to BCBS (2005a), par. 404: "[ . . . ] a bank must have a minimum of seven 
borrower grades for non-defaulted borrowers and one for those that have defaulted." 
Since the number of firms in my data set is sufficiently large, I decided to use nine rating 
classes for non-defaulters and one for defaulters. As was shown in Schwaiger et al. (2004) 
using more rating classes presents the advantage of reducing the differences between 
estimated and true PDs. Individual PDs differ across firms in a particular rating class. The 
deviations o f t h e individual PDs from the overall PD o f t h e rating class are higher than if 
the rating class was broken up into several subgroups. 
Moreover, if one uses nine plus one rating classes, the results are comparable with rating 
agencies such as Moody ' s and S&P since they use rating systems with the same number of 
rating classes. 
As a next step, it is necessary to choose PD boundaries or Creditreform solvency index 
boundaries to distribute the firms into the rating classes. The only requirement of the 
N B C A can be found in paragraph 403: "A bank must have a meaningful distribution of 
exposures across grades with no excessive concentrations, on both its borrower-rating and 
its facility-rating scales." 
There are many different methods in order to set up the boundaries. However, according to 
Schwaiger et al. (2004) no natural optimal solution exists. 
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Nevertheless, there are criteria that a sound rating system should comply with. First, as 
suggested by the NBCA, the concentration of companies among rating classes should be 
reasonable. Secondly, the PDs of the rating classes should monotonicaly increase as we 
move towards worse rating classes. Thirdly, the expected PD of a rating class coming from 
the regression model should be in accordance with the empirical (historical) PD computed 
from the data set. 
I decided to use two more promising approaches as suggested by Schwaiger et al. (2004). 
First, rating classes are set so that every class has the same number of observations. Thus, 
in case of nine rating classes, approximately 11% of observations are in every rating class. 
Secondly, the thresholds are set so that the number of defaults increases linearly from the 
best to the worst rating class.27 
When setting up the rating classes all observations in the data sample from 1998 to 2004 
are used. Hence, all possible information contained in the data sample is employed. 
The PD of a particular rating class is calculated as the average expected PD of all firms 
within the rating class. To check how the rating system complies with the requirement of 
accordance, the so called cohort methodology is applied as well. Under the cohort 




where i = /,...,9; PD, represents the probability of default of rating class /, D, is the 
observed number of defaults in class i and N, stands for the total number of companies in 
class /'. 
' See a p p e n d i x 4 for de ta i l s . 
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The results o f t h e calibration o f t h e two rating systems are summarized in the two following 
chapters. 
5.2.1. Uniform distribution of firms in rating classes 
T o achieve the uniform distribution of firms in rating classes the thresholds were set as in 
the fol lowing Table 8: 
Table 8 
Thresholds 
Rating class 1 100-213 
Rating class 2 214-248 
Rating class 3 249-264 
Rating class 4 265-279 
Rating class 5 280-289 
Rating class 6 290-297 
Rating class 7 298-306 
Rating class 8 307-334 
Rating class 9 335-499 
Outcomes o f t h e settings are summarized by the following Graph 7: 
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Graph 7 
The number of observations per rating class is approximately 11% o f t h e total number of 
observations in the data sample. This represents roughly 3 800 observations per rating 
class. The Graph 7 shows that PDs are behaving well, i.e. are increasing as we go from 
better rating classes to worse with a sharp jump from class 8 to class 9. Exact values of the 
probabilities of default are summarized in the following Table 7: 
Table 7 
Probability of default 
- Logit model 
Probability of default 
- Cohort approach 
Rating class 1 1.75% 1.76% 
Rating class 2 2.43% 2.69% 
Rating class 3 3.09% 3.12% 
Rating class 4 3.61% 4.18% 
Rating class 5 4.15% 3.62% 
Rating class 6 4.57% 4.26% 
Rating class 7 5.04% 4.30% 
Rating class 8 5.97% 6.11% 
Rating class 9 10.71% 11.25% 
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The table also shows PDs calculated according to the cohort approach. We can see that the 
logit model fits the data reasonably well as the results are in line with the observed 
historical PDs2 8 . Sophisticated tests of the accordance o f t h e expected PDs and historical 
PDs will be carried out in the next chapter devoted to rating system validation. 
The PD of 1.76% for the first rating class may seem high compared to the best rating 
classes in banks2 9 . However , 1 would like to point out that the data set used in this thesis 
does not represent a banking portfolio. 
5.2.2. Linear increase in number of defaults 
The thresholds are set so that the number of defaults increases linearly from the best to the 
worst rating class.30 Under this set up the expected number of defaults in a rating class as 
predicted by the logit model is following: 
Table 8 
Expected number of defaults 
Rating class 1 35 
Rating class 2 70 
Rating class 3 106 
Rating class 4 141 
Rating class 5 176 
Rating class 6 211 
Rating class 7 247 
Rating class 8 282 
Rating class 9 317 
To achieve such a distribution of expected defaults, threshold for particular classes were set 
as following: 
28 H o w e v e r , the P D s resu l t ing f rom the cohort approach are not tnonotonic, since the PD o f class 5 is smaller 
than the P D of c lass 4 . 
29 It is poss ib l e to ca l ib ra t e the rating system in such a w a y that the first rating class would have PD less than 
0 .5%. H o w e v e r , then t h e r e would be very few companies in the first rating class. 




Rating class 1 100-198 
Rating class 2 199-226 
Rating class 3 227-258 
Rating class 4 259-273 
Rating class 5 274-287 
Rating class 6 288-296 
Rating class 7 297-308 
Rating class 8 309-346 
Rating class 9 348-499 
Outcomes o f t h e setting are summarized by the following Graph 8: 
Graph 8 
Rating classes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
i 1 No. of companies (left axis) - » — PD s (right axis) 
The distribution of companies in rating classes does not have a clear shape and there is no 
extensive concentration of observations in any rating class. Moreover, the PDs are still 
monotonically increasing. Exact values of probabilities of default are summarized in the 
following Table 10: 
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Table 10 
Probability of default 
- Logit model 
Probability of default 
- Cohort approach 
Rating class 1 1.39% 1.05% 
Rating class 2 2.50% 3.75% 
Rating class 3 2.94% 2.59% 
Rating class 4 3.42% 3.68% 
Rating class 5 3.88% 3.86% 
Rating class 6 4.11% 3.96% 
Rating class 7 4.76% 3.98% 
Rating class 8 7.10% 7.51% 
Rating class 9 12.26% 12.94% 
When compared with PDs calculated by the cohort approach more differences appear, than 
in the setup with uniform distribution of companies. Although the rating class PDs 
according to the logit model are monotonic, PDs calculated according to the cohort method 
are not. Also note that the historical PDs for rating class 4, 5, 6 and 7 are very similar 
whereas the PDs from the logit model are not. Therefore, it can be expected that this 
particular calibration will yield worse results in the calibration tests. 
In this chapter, a logit regression model was introduced as the underlying qualitative model 
for the rating system. The regression model was successfully statistically checked and 
tested. An alternative regression model using additional information was also introduced, 
but this regression model failed in the statistical tests. 
Based on the regression model, two rating systems were calibrated and checked to see if 
they complied with the basic requirements of low concentration, monotony and accordance. 
However , more sophisticated validation of the rating systems is necessary to ensure that 
they are well calibrated and have explanatory power. The validation o f t h e rating systems 
will be the subject o f t h e next chapter. 
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6. Validation 
Many rating methods and rating systems were developed in the past years. Therefore, we 
need to answer the question of which rating methods and systems are preferable to others. 
After the publication of the second consultative document of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2001), the need to evaluate the quality of rating systems has became 
increasingly important. This document announced the possibility that an internal ratings 
based approach could form the basis for setting capital charges to credit risk. "The 
importance of sound validation techniques for rating systems stems from the fact that rating 
models of poor quality could lead to sub-optimal capital allocation." (Engelmann et al. 
2003, p . l ) 
The validation techniques employed throughout this chapter are standardized and widely 
described in literature, for example, BCBS (2005b), Moody's (2001) and Fernandes (2005) 
among others. 
The validation of a rating system consists of two areas. The first one is called 
discrimination and focuses on how good a rating system can, ex ante, distinguish between 
defaulting and not defaulting obligors, i.e. how powerful the rating system is. The second 
area of validation called calibration focuses on how good the probabilities of defaults of 
particular rating classes are estimated. This chapter covers both issues. 
All that is necessary for assessing the discriminatory power is to have rating scores 
produced by a rating system. The rating system can be, for example, a logit model that 
takes into consideration financial statements of an obligor (balance sheet and income 
statement) as well as certain industry, market and country characteristics, as shown in the 
previous chapter. 
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Calibration tests check the accordance of the expected PDs coming from a quantitative 
model with the historical PDs in the data set. Hence, if one calibrated a rating system using 
the so called cohort (historical) approach, no calibration tests would be necessary. 
However, since the rating systems presented in this thesis are based on a regression model 
it is necessary to test whether the predicted PDs from the model are in line with the 
historical PDs of the data set. 
Both rating systems presented in this thesis are based on the same information, i.e. the 
Creditreform solvency index. They just represent different regroupings o f t h e underlying 
indices. Therefore , 1 expect the two rating systems to yield similar results in the assessment 
of discriminatory power. Nevertheless, the discriminatory power analysis is carried out to 
show how powerful the rating systems are. 
Calibration tests are also carried out to check the accordance o f t h e expected PDs o f t h e 
rating classes based on the regression model with the historical PDs. Since the two rating 
systems are calibrated according to different methods, the tests of calibration should show 
which o f t h e two rating systems is superior. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, tests for discriminatory power are described and 
explained, namely, the cumulative accuracy profile (CAP), receiver operating 
characteristics (ROC) and the conditional information entropy ratio (CIER). Each 
validation technique is applied to the two rating systems. Secondly, calibration tests are 
introduced (binomial test and Hosmer-Lemeshow test) explained and applied. 
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6.1. Discriminatory power 
Whether an obligor defaults or not is not known in advance. Therefore, we face a binary 
classification problem. Rating systems based on present available data work as 
classification tools in order to determine future status of an obligor. The procedure of 
applying a classification tool in order to assess liiture status of an obligor is called 
discrimination. The discriminatory power of a rating system denotes its ability to, ex ante, 
distinguish between defaulting and non defaulting obligors. 
The ideal rating system would consist of only two rating classes where one class would be 
assigned to the expected defaulters and the other to the expected non defaulters. However, 
in practice this is not possible. Hence, multiple class rating systems are used '1. So, a rating 
system discriminates the better, the more the distribution of defaulters and the distribution 
of non defaulters differ in particular rating classes. 
6.1.1. Cumulative accuracy profile 
The cumulat ive accuracy profile (CAP) is a visual tool used to asses the discriminatory 
power of a rating system. Accuracy ratio (AR) is the most common summary index of 
CAP. Picture 5 below illustrates the cumulative accuracy profile. 
31 A g o o d ra t ing s y s t e m wil l assign higher share o f all defaulters in worse rating classes. Therefore , we can 
expec t that as w e m o v e to worse rating classes the relative share of defaulters will increase whereas the 
re la t ive sha re o f n o n de fau l t e r s will decrease. 
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Picture 5 
fraction of all companies 
Source: B C B S (2005b) 
When constructing the CAP, obligors are first ordered from worst to best, i.e. from obligors 
with the highest probability of default to the obligors with the lowest probability of default. 
The cumulat ive percentage of all ordered obligors is displayed on the x axis. The y axis 
shows the cumulat ive percentage of defaulters. The CAP maps the fraction of all companies 
with the worst score onto the fraction of companies within that group. 
A perfect rating model will assign defaulters with the worst scores. In this case the CAP is 
increasing linearly and then staying at one, since in the perfect model no defaulter should 
have good rating scores. "If the sample contained 10% defaulters, then a perfect model 
would exclude all those defaulters at 10% of the sample excluded; the 10% of companies 
with the lowest ranks would consist o f t h e defaults." (Moody's 2001, p.15) 
For a random model with no discriminative power a fraction x of all debtors with the lowest 
scores will contain x percent of all defaulters, thus producing a straight line from 
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coordinates [0,0] to [1,1], The two extreme cases represent boundaries for real rating 
systems. 
CAP is a visual tool to assess the discriminatory power of a rating system and the accuracy 
ratio serves as a summary index of the information represented by the CAP. In the rating 
system validation context, the AR is defined as the ratio o f t h e area between the CAP o f the 
rating model being validated and the CAP of the random model, and the area between the 
CAP o f t h e perfect rating model and the CAP of the random model. Therefore, the rating 
model is all the better the closer the AR is to one. According to the notation on Picture 4 the 
AR is defined as 
The CAPs for the two rating systems set up in this thesis are presented below. 
Graph 9 
Cumulat ive accuracy profile 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Cumulative percentage of all companies 
Uniform distribution model Random model | 
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The Graph 9 above shows the cumulative accuracy profile for the uniform distribution 
rating system. The accuracy ratio AR is equal to 37.4%. The CAP reveals that 10% of 
companies with the worst rating scores contain almost 30% of all defaults. Moreover, 50% 
of total defaults are captured in about 30% of companies with the worst scores. 
Graph 10 
—•— Linear default increase model —•— Random model 
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Cumulative percentage of all companies 
The CAP for the linear default increase rating system (as shown on Graph 10) is very 
similar to the previous CAP and the AR is slightly lower: 37.1%. 
The results o f t h e CAP analysis show that both models are quite powerful. The fact that the 
results for the two rating systems are very similar is in agreement with my expectations/2 
Validation of rating systems can be done in many ways and the CAP is just one of them. 
The next chapter introduces another validation method. 
For detai ls on this mat ter see appendix 5. 
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6.1.2. Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
This validation technique is based on the relative positions o f t h e distribution of defaulters 
and the distribution of non defaulters. The idea is illustrated on Picture 6 below. 
Picture 6 
Source: B C B S (2005b), modified by the author 
A perfectly discriminating rating system would give defaulters and non defaulters such 
scores that their distributions would not overlap. However, real rating systems in general 
cannot achieve perfect discrimination and, therefore, the two distributions will overlap. 
Picture 5 illustrates the idea. 
With the Creditreform solvency index in mind, we face the decision as where to set the 
threshold value C in order to distinguish between potential defaulters and non defaulters. 
After setting this threshold all obligors with a rating score lower than C will be marked as 
potential non defaulters and obligors with rating score higher than C as potential defaulters. 
Since we are in a two state world, there are four possible outcomes; two outcomes are 
correct and the other two are classified as either type I (wrongly classifying non defaulter as 
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defaulter) or type II (wrongly classifying defaulter as non defaulter) error. All possibilities 
are summarized in Tab le 11 below. 
Table 11 
Obligor subsequently 
defaults not defaults 





TYPE 1 ERROR 
(false alarm) 
Rating score below 
threshold C 





Making either type of error can be rather costly for a bank. When a bank commits a type II 
error then it gives a loan to a company that subsequently defaults. The cost in this case 
takes the form o f lost interest, principal, expenses on collection process, bankruptcy 
proceedings and so on. Hcnce, banks can be expected to be extremely sensitive to this type 
of error. Making type I error comes at a cost too, but in this case the cost is not as obvious. 
The cost in this case is the foregone business (opportunity cost), i.e. the amount of profit 
the bank could have made if it had correctly given the credit. 
The problem is that a bank can only measure the magnitude of type II error, i.e. the default 
rate in the banking portfolio. Banks are not able to measure the magnitude of type I error 
they make. Hence, when building a rating system on a banking portfolio it is necessary to 
keep this selection bias in mind. 
The advantage of my data set is that it comes from an external agency and is, thus, free of 
the selection bias. On the other hand, the overall default rate in the data set can be expected 
to be higher. Banks try to differentiate potential clients to "good" ones and "bad" ones and 
provide credit only to the "good" ones. However, no such differentiation is done by 
Credi treform. 
-55-
Let us define the fraction of defaulters that was correctly classified for a given threshold C 
as the hit rate. The hit rate can be written as HR(C) = ^ ^ , where H(C) is the number of 
N D 
defaulter classified correctly for a given threshold C, and ND i s the total number of 
defaulters in the sample. Let us define the fraction of non defaulters that were incorrectly 
classified as defaulters for a given threshold C to the total number of non defaulters as the 
F(C) false alarm rate. Then the false alarm rate F A R ( C ) = - ^ , where F(C) is the number of 
^ND 
false alarms for a give threshold C and N n d is the total number of non defaulters in the 
sample. 
If we compute HR(C) and FAR(C) for all possible Cs and plot them against each other we 
get the receiver operating characteristic curve. A rating model is all the better the larger the 
area under the ROC curve is. Let us denote this area by AUC (area under curve). For 




false alarm rate 
ra t i ng m o d e l 
r a n d o m m o d e l 
p e r f e c t m o d e l 
Source: BCBS (2005b) 
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The area under the ROC curve is equal to the following formula: 
i 
A U C = JHR(FAR)C/(FAR). AUC is equal to 0.5 for a random model with no 
o 
discriminative power and to I for a perfect model. However, as in the AR case, these values 
represent the extremes. Real rating systems will be in between. 
The following paragraphs are devoted to application of the ROC method to the two rating 
systems of this thesis. The application will be done first for the uniform distribution rating 
system followed by the linear default increase rating system. 
Before calculating the ROC for the uniform distribution rating system, it is useful to have a 
look on the distribution of defaulters and non-defaulters across the rating classes. A perfect 
rating system would separate completely the distributions of defaulters and non defaulters. 
So, Graph I 1 below can be used as a visual tool to show the performance of the uniform 
distribution rating system in separation ofdefaulters and non defaulters. 
Graph 1 I 
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We observe that the number of non-defaulters is roughly constant across all rating classes 
whereas the number of defaults increases as we move to worse rating classes. The ratin« 
system has tendency to put more defaulters in worse rating classes. 
Graph 12 below shows the ROC curve for the uniform distribution rating system. 
Graph 12 
Receiver operating characteristics 
Uniform distribution model Random model 
The area under curve is in this case equal to 64.46%. 
The same exercise is performed for the linear default increase rating system. First, as is the 
case for the previous rating system, the distribution of defaulters and non-defaulters is 
presented. See Graph 13 below. 
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Graph 13 
Distribution of defaulters and non-defaulters 
25% 
20% 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Rating classes 
O Defaulters bd Non-defaulters 
We can see clearly the linear increase in the relative share of defaulters as we move towards 
the worse rating classes since it was the condition the rating system was built on. The 
relative share of non-defaulters has no clear shape. Nevertheless, we observe that the rating 
system has tendency to separate defaulters and non defaulters even thought the separation is 
not perfect. 




Receiver operat ing characteristics 
False alarm rate 
Linear default increase model —•— Random model 
The receiver operating characteristic for this rating system looks very similar to the other 
rating system. The area under curve is again slightly lower and is equal to 64.28%. 
Again, as when assessing the discriminatory power by the CAP, very similar results are 
obtained. The reason for the very similar results in CAP and ROC analysis of the both 
rating system is that these systems are based on the same underlying information. This 
information is the Creditreform index. The two rating systems are just different regroupings 
of the Creditreform indices. These rating systems cannot discriminate any better than the 
Creditreform indices discriminate". 
Although the CAP and ROC methods are based on different theoretical foundations, the 
results of these two validation techniques are very similar. We can see the similarities when 
we compare the Graphs 9 and 12 and Graphs 10 and 14. Engelmann et al. (2003) showed 
" See a p p e n d i x 5 for de ta i l s on this matter. 
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that there is a relationship between the accuracy ratio and the area under curve. The 
relationship is following: AR = 2AUC - 134. 
6.1.3. Conditional Information Entropy Ratio (CIER) 
The conditional information entropy ratio is the last validation technique of the 
discriminatory power presented in this thesis. The CIER measures the overall amount of 
uncertainty represented by a probability distribution. In the rating system validation 
context, it is used to assess how well a rating model reduces uncertainty. We compare the 
amount of uncertainty in a state of total ignorance35 (no rating model) to the amount of 
uncertainty left over after introduction of a rating model36. Since the main goal in credit risk 
management is to reduce uncertainty, the information entropy ratio represents a measure of 
how well a model is performing. 
In a two state world, an obligor has only two future possibilities. Either the obligor will 
default with a probability p over a certain time period or the obligor will not default with a 
probability 1-p over the same time period. The probabilities of the outcomes provide partial 
information for the future status. Let us define the Information = - ln( / ; ) as the amount of 
additional information needed to completely determine whether or not the obligor will 
default. 
If it is certain that the obligor will default (p=l) then the amount of additional information 
required is equal to - l n ( l ) = 0 . Since, there is no uncertainty about the outcome; there can 
be no previously unknown relevant information. 
3,1 For p r o o f s ee E n g e l m a n n et al. ( 2003) appendix A. 
35 In s tate o f total i g n o r a n c e only the overall P D of a portfolio can be measured. Since this is the only 
ava i lab le i n f o r m a t i o n , e v e r y obl igor in the portfol io is expected to default with this probability. 
36 N o w , it is p o s s i b l e to ass ign every obl igor a P D of a rating class it belongs to. 
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Having defined this Information we can now define the information entropy H(p) of an 
event with p robab i l i typ as: 
H(p) = ~{p ln(/>) + (I - p) ln(l - p)). 
The information entropy visualized as a function o f p is presented in the following Graph 
15. 
Graph 15 
It can be seen that the information entropy reaches maximum at / ; = 0.5. This represents the 
greatest uncertainty, i.e. the highest amount of additional information is needed to decide 
whether the obligor will default or not. I f p equals to zero or one, we know with certainty 
whether the obligor will default or not. 
The above mentioned logic can be applied to a rating system that puts each obligor into a 
rating class. The purpose of a rating system is to reduce uncertainty present in the portfolio 
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via the separation o f obligors into rating classes. Once we have rating classes, we can 
define the condit ional entropy as H i (P (D |R , ) ) , i.e. the information entropy o f t h e 
conditional probabil i ty of default given rating class R,. In line with H(p) the conditional 
entropy can be written as: 
H, (P( PD| R j ) ) = -(P( PD| R, )log(P( PD| R, ))+P( (1 -PD)| R, )log(P( (1 -PD)| R,))) 
This expression can be also rewritten as: 
H, = - E [ P ( P D | Ri)log(P( PD| R, ))+P( (1 -PD)| R, )log(P( (1 -PD)| R,) ) ] 
Now, we can def ine the Conditional Information Entropy Ratio (CIER) as: 
n 
I " , 
CIER = 1 - — — , 
H t 
where n is the number of rating classes and Hr is the entropy given only by the portfolio 
itself, i.e. H T =- (PDlog(PD)+( l -PD)log( l -PD)) 3 7 . 
CIER is s imply one minus the ratio o f t h e entropy based on the rating classes to the entropy 
given only by the data itself. The value of CIER will be all the closer to one the more 
information about defaults is contained in the rating model. If the rating model were 
perfectly predictive, the CIER would equal to 1 (no uncertainty). On the contrary, if the 
model held no predictive power the CIER would be 0. 
37 T h e P D here is the overa l l PD in the portfolio. 
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In other words, the CIER shows how much information we gained by introducing the rating 
model that enables us to say which obligor will certainly default and which obligor will 
certainly not defaul t . 





default rating system 
CIER 51.9% 46.9% 
The CIER is a measure of the reduction of uncertainty associated with a particular model 
for a given portfol io. Therefore, it provides an unambiguous measure of a model 
performance under the condition that all the models are applied to the same portfolio. 
However, the CIERs for the two rating models are, again, similar not allowing to tell which 
rating system is superior over the other. 
From the three validation methods presented so far, the cumulative accuracy profile along 
with the accuracy ratio are mostly used by other researchers in this field. For example, 
Fernandes (2005) constructed rating systems with the accuracy ratios ranging from 25% to 
43.8%. These results are comparable with the results in this thesis. However, according to 
Moody ' s (2001) the accuracy ratio of its professional rating system RiskCalc exceeds 60%. 
Having discr iminatory power is one of the requirements of a sound rating system. 
However, a rating system also needs to fit the underlying data well. This is the criteria of 
accordance. In case of the rating systems set up in this thesis, the theoretical or expected 
PDs of rating classes estimated by the regression model need to be in line with the real PDs 
calculated directly f rom the data set. The analysis of accordance (or calibration) will be the 
subject o f the fol lowing chapter. 
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6.2. Calibration 
The focus o f t h e previous chapter was on testing how well the two rating systems perform 
in discr iminat ion be tween default ing and non defaulting obligors. However, in reality, 
rating sys tems do not serve just as a basis for deciding whether to grant a loan or not. 
„Rather, they form the basis for pricing credits and calculating risk premiums and capital 
charges." (Enge lmann et al. 2003, p. 28) Therefore, obligors are grouped into rating classes 
and the probabi l i ty o f default is quantitatively assessed for every rating class 
This chapter is focused on the analysis of how well the estimated probabilities of default for 
each rating class ref lect the true historical probability of default. The correct estimation of 
PD o f rating c lasses is vital for banks adopting the IRB approach since it, according to 
Engelmann et al. 2003 , influences their amount of regulatory capital. Hence, banks will 
have to devote a lot of t ime to calibration of their rating systems. Correct calibration of a 
rating system m e a n s that that the PD estimates are accurate. 
Test ing of cor rec tness of a calibration can be done separately for each rating class 
(binomial test) o r in a joint test (Hosmer-Lemeshow test). The caveat is that defaults are not 
independent , they tend to be correlated. As a consequence, standard independence based 
tests are likely to be biased when applied to credit portfolios. 
In this chapter , t he two calibration tests - binomial and Hosmer-Lemeshow are explained 
and subsequent ly applied. 
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6.2.1. Binomial test 
Undergoing this test, we form the two following hypothesis: 
HO: the PD of a rating class is correct 
H l: the PD o f a rating class is underestimated 
Given a conf idence level, the H0 is rejected if the number of historical defaults k in a 
particular rating class is greater than or equal to a critical value c. 
The approximation formula of the binomial test that takes the following form (see 
Engelmann et al. (2003)) is used for calculations38. 
c, = <\y' (q)^n,*PD,(l-PD,) + n, * PDi 
where i = /,... ,9 represents the rating classes, n, stands for the number of obligors in class /', 
PDj is the probability of default of class i and is the inverse of standard normal 
distribution function. 
BCBS (2005b) argues that if correlation effects were accommodated, higher values for c, 
would be obtained. However, the problem is the estimation of the correlations. Modeling 
correlations of defaults is a very complex issue and is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, the binomial test can serve as an early warning system. With the assumption 
of no correlation, c, values are lower and thus H0 will be rejected more often. Hence, if Ho 
is rejected for a particular rating class, further research is necessary. 
Results for the two rating systems are presented in Tables 13 and 14 below: 
38 N o t e tha t th i s set u p o f the b inomia l test is s impl i f ied s ince the correlations among defaul t events are not 
taken into a c c o u n t . 
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Table 13 
Uniform distribution ratinq system 
Rating class Estimated PD 
Number of 
defaults - k Critical value - c Null hypothesis 
1 1.75% 67 85 NOT REJECTED 
2 2.43% 99 111 NOT REJECTED 
3 3.09% 116 139 NOT REJECTED 
4 3.61% 167 172 NOT REJECTED 
5 4.15% 130 177 NOT REJECTED 
6 4.57% 175 219 NOT REJECTED 
7 5.04% 162 221 NOT REJECTED 
8 5.97% 234 263 NOT REJECTED 
9 10.71% 437 461 NOT REJECTED 
Table 14 
Linear default increase rating system 
Rating class Estimated PD 
Number of 
defaults - k Critical value - c 
Null hypothesis 
1 1.39% 26 48 NOT REJECTED 
2 2.50% 90 78 REJECTED 
3 2.94% 109 149 NOT REJECTED 
4 3.42% 144 160 NOT REJECTED 
5 3.88% 171 202 NOT REJECTED 
6 4.11% 195 235 NOT REJECTED 
7 4.76% 216 295 NOT REJECTED 
8 7.10% 301 322 NOT REJECTED 
9 12.26% 335 356 NOT REJECTED 
The rat ing sys tem with the uni form distribution of companies within rating classes passes 
the b inomina l test for all rating classes. The H0 of correctness of the estimated PD cannot 
be rejected for any ra t ing class. 
The ra t ing sys tem with linear increases of defaults passes the test in all but one rating class. 
The PD o f ra t ing class no. 2 is underestimated since we reject H0 in favor of H, for this 
rating class. H o w e v e r , as suggested above, since the correlations of defaults are not taken 
into account the critical value c, is underestimated. Thus, it is possible that we could not 
have been able to re ject H 0 if we took the correlations into account. 
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Based on the binomial test, no clear decision about which of the two rating systems 
presented in this thesis is favorable over the other can be made. To make a valid judgment 
the correlations of defaults would need to be estimated to ensure correct critical values c„ 
Still, the binomial test serves as an early warning mechanism indicating that the criteria of 
accordance might not be fulfilled by the linear default increase rating system. 
6.2.2. Hosmer-Lemeshow test39 
Let us define test statistic: 
n - i ^ r 
,=1 n,P,l\~P) 
where k = 9 (number of rating classes), n\ = number of companies in rating class /, D, is the 
number of defaulted obligors in class p, is the forecasted probability of default for rating 
class i. 
The p-value of xL i t e s t serves as a measure of the accuracy of the estimated default 
probabilities. However, there is no critical value of p that could be used to determine 
whether the estimated PDs are correct or not. Simply put, the closer the p-value is to zero 
the worse the estimation is. Nevertheless, this test can be used for comparison of rating 
systems. 
The results for the two rating systems are summarized in Table 15 below: 
39 For de ta i l s on this test s e e B C B S (2005b) . 
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Table 13 




p-value 0.001 0.181 
We can conclude that the uniform distribution model is superior. This finding was indicated 
by the binomial test presented in previous chapter. 
Before using a rating system for calculating the minimal capital requirements for credit risk 
it is necessary to validate the rating system. A sound rating system has to comply with 
criteria of good discriminatory power and good calibration. 
The widely accepted and used validation techniques were subject of this chapter. 
Cumulative accuracy profile, receiver operating characteristics and conditional information 
entropy ratio were introduced to asses the discriminatory power of the rating systems 
whereas the binomial and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests were presented in order to check 
calibration (accordance) o f t h e rating systems. 
Both rating systems performed well in the discriminatory tests. In the case ofcalibration the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test revealed that the uniform distribution rating system is favorable 
over the linear default increase rating system. Therefore, the uniform distribution rating 
system will be used tor calculating the regulatory capital requirement by the internal ratings 
based approach. 
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7. Regulatory capital 
Under the N e w Basel Capital Accord (NBCA), banks will be able to use the internal credit 
risk assessment o f their obligors in order to determine the minimal regulatory capital 
requirements. The first pillar o f t h e NBCA defines two broad methods for calculating the 
credit risk regulatory capital. These two methods, the standardized approach and the 
internal ratings based (IRB) approach, were described in detail in chapters 2 and 3 of this 
thesis. 
Up to now, several alternative methods for determining one of the key risk components -
the probability of default (PD) were developed. A logit regression model was set up to 
estimate PDs of all companies in the data set. Several alternative regression models were 
proposed, tested and the best one chosen. Two alternative approaches to calibration of a 
rating system were also suggested. Once more, the two calibrations underwent excessive 
validation and the one with better results was chosen. At this point, we are ready to make 
regulatory capital est imations according to the standardized and the foundation IRB 
approaches. 
The Credi treform database contains turnover information for all companies that were 
assigned the solvency index in the year 2004. Under the assumption that every company 
has a bank credit of 10% of its turnover, the exposure at default (EAD) for eveiy company 
in the year 2004 was calculated (8 348 companies in total). Hence, the regulatory capital 
requirements calculated in this thesis are for the year 2005. 
In order to prove the central hypothesis of this thesis the regulatory capital was calculated 
according to both N B C A methods (standardized approach and the IRB approach). 
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7.1. Standardized approach 
Under the standardized approach, every obligor is assigned a risk weight (RW) according to 
its rating f rom an external company40 . See Picture 8 for details. Regulatory capital for every 
exposure is calculated according to the following formula: 
Regulatory capital = EAD*RW*0.08 
The regulatory capital on the whole portfolio is simply the sum of regulatory capital on 
every single exposure. 
Picture 8 
Credi t a s s e s s m e n t AAA to 
AA-
A+ to A- BBB+ to BB- Below 
BB-
Unrated 
Risk w e i g h t 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
Source: B C B S (2005a) 
For the computat ion of the regulatory capital on the portfolio, we can either consider all 
obligors as unrated (with 100% risk weight) or we can map the rating classes o f t h e rating 
system developed in this thesis to ratings of an external rating company. Note that under the 
assumption of unrated companies, the resulting capital requirements will be the same as if 
calculated according to the Basel I approach. Both of these methods, i.e. the unrated 
standardized N B C A / Basel I approach and the mapping method, are applied. 
For the mapping procedure, estimates of the probability of default of external ratings are 
necessary. Hanson and Schuermann (2005) estimated annual probabilities of default for 
S&P rated U.S. obligors from year 1981 to 2002. For details, see the Table 16 below. These 
PD est imates are used to map the rating classes to the S&P ratings. 
40 T h e risk w e i g h t s are ass igned accord ing to the B C B S (2005a), paragraph 66. 
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Table 13 
S&P ratings PD estimates S&P ratings PD estimates S&P ratings PD estimates 
AAA 0.00% A- 0.06% BB- 2.07% 
AA+ 0.00% BBB+ 0.31% B+ 3.50% 
AA 0.00% BBB 0.36% B 9.82% 
AA- 0.04% BBB- 0.40% B- 14.30% 
A+ 0.05% BB+ 0.55% CCC 28.53% 
A 0.07% BB 1.16% 
T h e resu l t s o f l h e m a p p i n g p r o c e d u r e are summar ized in the Table 18 below: 





Rating class 1 100-213 1.75% BB-
Rating class 2 214-248 2.43% B+ 
Rating class 3 249-264 3.09% B+ 
Rating class 4 265-279 3.61% B 
Rating class 5 280-289 4.15% B 
Rating class 6 290-297 4.57% B 
Rating class 7 298-306 5.04% B 
Rating class 8 307-334 5.97% B 
Rating class 9 335-499 10.71% B 
W e can d i r e c t l y o b s e r v e tha t o n l y obl igors in the first rating class will be assigned risk 
we igh t 1 0 0 % (501 c o m p a n i e s ) whi l e all the other obligors will have 150% risk weight 
(7 847 c o m p a n i e s ) . T h e r e su l t i ng regula tory capital requi rements are summar ized in the 
f o l l o w i n g T a b l e 18. 
Tab l e 18 
Capital requirements (mio. CZK) - standardized approach 
All obligors unrated / Basel I approach 31 983,30 
Mapping to S&P ratings 42 526,71 
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It is not surprising that under the mapping method, the capital requirements are higher since 
most of the obligors in the portfolio are assigned risk weight 150% instead of 100% as is 
the case in the unrated method or the Basel I method. Considering the whole portfolio, the 
EAD weighted average risk weight is equal to 133%, resulting in higher regulatoiy capital. 
The EAD weighted average risk weight for the unrated method is, by definition, equal to 
100%. 
Note that calculating capital requirements for every exposure and then summing up to 
obtain the capital requirement for the whole portfolio is equivalent to multiplying the 8% of 
total EAD for all obligors by the EAD weighted average risk weight.41 
7.2. Internal ratings based approach 
As the IRB approach was described in detail in chapter 3, only the calculations are 
performed in this chapter. The regulatory capital calculated by the IRB approach is equal 
to 37 206.34 million CZK. All capital requirements are compared in the following Table 
Table 19 
Capital requirements (in mio. CZK) 
Unrated / Basel 1 31 983.30 
Mapping to S&P 42 526.71 
IRB 37 601.10 
The results show that the capital requirements on the portfolio are lowest for the unrated / 
Basel I approach followed by the IRB approach. When the rating classes are mapped to the 
41 The p r o o f to th is s t a t e m e n t is s t ra ight forward. It is jus t necessary to realize that the E A D weighted average 
risk weight is d e f i n e d as * ) • 
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S&p ratings the h ighes t amount of regulatory capital is obtained. The application o f t h e 
IRB approach yields higher regulatory capital requirements when compared to the unrated 
standardized N B C A / Basel 1 approach. The difference makes 5 617.8 million CZK. 
However, if the rating classes were mapped to S&P ratings then the IRB approach would 
result in lower regulatory capital requirements. The difference in this case amounts to 
4 925.61 million C Z K . 
Hence, the data set used in this thesis does not allow for proving the hypothesis that the 
IRB approach yields lowers regulatory capital requirements than the Basel 1 approach. In 
the case of the standardized NBCA approach, the results are ambiguous. Whether the 
hypothesis is proven or not depends on what is taken for benchmark. 
Stephanou and M e n d o z a (2005) show the capital requirements for a single exposure under 
the Basel 1 approach and the standardized and the IRB approach o f t h e NBCA and come to 





Credit Rating and Related PD 
Source: Stephanou and Mendoza (2005) 
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Even though Picture 9 shows capital charge for a single exposure under the three 
approaches, it is possible to generalize the results for a whole credit portfolio if it is 
considered a structured single exposure. For the data set used in this thesis, this analysis is 
carried out in the following paragraph. 
Under the Basel 1 approach, the capital charge for the whole credit portfolio will always 
stay at 8% since this approach is not sensitive to risks o f t h e portfolio. Considering the 
mapping approach described in the previous paragraphs, the capital charge equals to 
10.64%A2. For the IRB approach, it is necessary to find an average PD for the whole 
portfolio so that the minimal regulatory capital calculated for every single exposure and 
then summed up would equal the minimal regulatory capital calculated for the total 
exposure41. The average PD for the whole portfolio was found using the iterative method 
and equals to 3.04%. With the average PD at hand, it is possible to calculate the capital 
charge under the IRB approach44. In this case, the capital charge is equal to 9.41%. When 
looking at Picture 8, we see that the data set used in this thesis represents a credit portfolio 
with a rating somewhere between BB and B (using notation from Picture 9). 
Also Schwaiger (2003) shows that a lower quality portfolio will face higher capital charge 
whereas a higher quality portfolio will face lower capital charges. Hence, the data set used 
in this thesis contains companies with higher credit risk, resulting in higher regulatory 
capital charges compared to the unrated standardized NBCA / Basel I approach. 
According to the author 's knowledge, the research on credit risk modeling using real data is 
limited, probably because o f t h e lack of public data. From recent studies, Fernandes (2005) 
calculated minimal capital requirements for a data set of private firms bank loans of a 
42 T h e capi tal c h a r g e is ca lcula ted as 8 % t imes the E A D weighted average risk weight (1.33). 
43 S imply put , w e need to so lve the fol lowing equat ion for PD: 
X (8% * K(PD,, LGD, M) * 12.5 * EAD,) = 8% * K(PD, LGD, M)* 12.5 * £ EAD,. 
i ' 1 
44 The capital charge is calculated as 8% * K{PD, LGD, M ) * 12.5 = K(PD, LGD,M). 
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Portuguese bank with the conclusion that the IRB approach yields lower regulatory capital 
requirements compared to the Basel I approach. Kadlcakova and Kepiinger (2004) compare 
capital requirements for a Creditreform data set under the IRB approach and other credit 
risk models. However , they do not present results for the standardized NBCA approach. 
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8. Conclusion 
As was first stated in the introduction, the banks' central role in the economic system 
makes it necessary for them to be subject to an extensive regulation in order to prevent 
severe distortions in the economy. In order to do so, it was essential to standardize the 
behavior of all internationally active banks. This was achieved by the Basel Capital Accord 
(also known as Basel I) introduced in 1988 that is now being replaced by the New Basel 
Capital Accord (also known as Basel II). Both these accords were presented extensively in 
the past chapters. 
The central hypothesis that I tried to empirically prove in this thesis was that the IRB 
methodology brings benefits in fonn of lower regulatory capital held for credit risk 
compared to the Basel I methodology and the standardized approach of the NBCA. 
In this thesis, the methodology chosen to achieve this goal was to elaborate a rating system 
of my own, and in that regard, my proceedings were as follows. 
First of all, general overview of both Basel Capital Accords was provided. When describing 
the NBCA emphasis was put on the first pillar that deals with capital requirements. 
Detailed analysis of the internal ratings based approach was also conducted along with 
detailed description o f t h e underlying model and methodology accompanied by theoretical 
argumentation in favor o f t h e IRB approach over the standardized one. 
Finding a valid data set on which to base my rating system was critical, and the data set was 
used to create the system itself. All steps of the procedure were explained in detail. The 
core o f t h e rating system is a logit regression model. Two alternative regression models 
were introduced, statistically tested and the superior one was chosen. One of the most 
important steps, setting up the rating classes, was performed in two alternative ways since 
there is no natural optimal solution. Hence, two alternative rating systems were created. 
-77-
After the rating sys tems were outlined, the next necessary step was the validation. Here, the 
concept of discr iminatory power was introduced. Cumulative accuracy profile, followed by 
receiver operat ing characteristics and conditional information entropy ratio respectively 
were outlined and used for validation o f t h e two rating systems constructed in this thesis. 
After the val idat ion of rating systems, calibration, the next necessary step, was performed. 
Here, binomial and Hosmer-Lemeshow tests were utilized in order to check sound 
calibration o f t h e two rating systems. The results o f t h e test for the two rating systems were 
compared and the better one was chosen for calculation of the capital requirements under 
the IRB approach. 
The validated rat ing system was used to calculate the regulatory capital for credit risk. 
Regulatory capital calculations according to the Basel I and the standardized and internal 
ratings based approach o f t h e N B C A were conducted. 
As a conclusion, the central hypothesis of this thesis was not proven, since the capital 
requirements under the IRB approach yielded higher regulatory capital than the Basel I or 
standardized N B C A approach (with all companies assumed unrated). However, when the 
rating classes o f t h e rating system developed in this thesis were mapped to external ratings, 
higher regulatory capital charges were obtained by the NBCA standardized approach 
compared to the IRB approach. 
The findings in this thesis are in line with other research in this field stating that under the 
IRB approach lower quality portfolios should face higher capital charges. The data set used 
in my work contained companies with higher credit risk resulting in higher regulatory 
capital charges. 
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The whole exercise o f building an internal rating system was undertaken with the aim to 
understand and, hence, present the system of a bank's internal mechanisms, which are used 
to control and mitigate credit risk. This analytical approach was chosen with the goal of 
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The Value at Risk (VaR)45 methodology was developed in the late 1970s and 1980s by 
major financial institutions seeking a model to measure aggregate risks across their entire 
portfolios. VaR is a single summary statistical measure of possible portfolio losses. 
However , it is necessary to bear in mind that the VaR is based on some estimation 
procedure and is, therefore, an estimation itself and that it may differ from the true VaR. 
One o f t h e advantages of VaR is that it can be applied to a variety of risks such as, credit 
risk, market risk and operational risk. The resulting VaRs also provide a common and 
consistent measure. Hence, different types of risk can be directly compared. 
Simply put, VaR refers to the maximum amount of money that is likely to be lost over 
certain period"1, at some confidence level. A 99% confidence level can be chosen, in which 
case the VaR estimate covers all but the largest 1% of losses. Choosing the 99% confidence 
level is equal to saying that in one year out of 100, a loss greater than the VaR estimate is 
expected. Alternatively, it can be said than in 99 years out of 100 the maximum expected 
loss is less or equal to the VaR estimate. 
The model underlying the internal rating based approach works with 99.9% confidence 
level. Hence, the regulatory capital of a bank calculated by the IRB approach should be 
sufficient to cover all unexpected losses o f t h e bank in 999 years out of 1000. 
In order to employ the VaR measure on a certain portfolio, it is necessary to have a 
distribution function of expected values o f t h e portfolio. The distribution function can be 
45 " T h e V a l u e at r i sk ( V a R ) is the m a x i m u m expected loss over a given horizon period at a given level of 
c o n f i d e n c e . " ( D o w d 2002 , p. 39) 
4 6 In the c red i t r i sk con tex t , the per iod is considered to be one year. 
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based on an analytical approach47 or simulated by the Monte Carlo simulation. Once the 
distribution function is known, the value for the selected percentile, for example, the 99th 
percentile can be calculated to get the VaR measure. 
The regulatory capital a bank needs to hold for credit risk then correspond to the VaR 
minus the mean o f t h e distribution function. The mean of the distribution represents the 
expected losses and, under the IRB methodology, banks are supposed to cover for expected 
losses themselves by provisions, etc. Hence, the regulatory capital serves as a cushion 
against unexpected losses in credit portfolio. 
Perhaps it is better to illustrate the VaR by the following Picture 10. 
Picture 10 
47 T h i s is the c a s e o f t h e model under lying the IRB approach. 
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The probability densi ty function represents the distribution of losses of a bank's credit 
portfolio and the selected confidence interval corresponds to the loss of value X. As shown 
on the picture, the regulatory capital is equal to X minus the expected losses. 
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Appendix 248 
An example calculation of the Creditreform solvency index is presented in this appendix. 
When calculating the solvency index, certain pieces of information concerning a company 
are taken into account. For details, see Table 20 below. 
Table 20 
Legal form Limited liability 
Business sector Construction 
Age of company 12 years 
Company's business development Constant 
Order book situation Good 
Mode of payments In line with agreed terms 
Credit opinion Relationship admissible 
Risk factors Weights 
in % 
Classil 'ication 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mode of payments 20 40 
Credit opinion 25 50 
Business development 8 24 
Order book situation 7 14 
Legal form 4 16 
Business sector 4 12 
Age of company 4 8 
Turnover 2 6 
Turnover per employee 4 12 
Number of employees 2 8 
Equity 4 8 
Capital turnover 4 12 
Payment moral 4 8 
Payment moral of customers 4 8 
Shareholder structure 4 12 
TOTAL 100 136 78 24 
Solvency Index 238 
48 T h e e x a m p l e w a s ob ta ined f rom the Credi t re form webpage - lHtp://www.creditreromi.c//boi)ity<)02.hn)i 
[ 1 0 - 0 2 - 2 0 0 5 ] t rans la ted by the author . 
Appendix 451 
Logit regression is use fill to model relationships where the dependent variable assumes 
only two states (in the case of modeling defaults I stands for default whereas 0 stands for 
non default) and the independent variables are of any type. Logit regression estimates the 
probability of an event occurring. The dependent variable is transformed into a logit 
variable and maximum likelihood is applied for computation. Compared to ordinary least 
squares regression, logit regression estimates changes in the log odds of the dependent 
variable, not changes in the dependent itself. 
Let be a binary variable assuming 0, if company i has not defaulted over a given period 
of time, and I otherwise. Let the vector x / , X i 2 , . . . ,X j k represent the & explanatory variables. 
The goal of logistic regression is to model the conditional probability that a company i 
defaults, i.e. Pr(^, = l|xf) = 7r(xf) and the conditional probability that the company does 
not default, i.e. P r ( ^ = 0|*?) = 1 -? r (x f ) • The odds that company ; defaults is then: 
odds = P /(\- P) = -
l-ff(x) 
Hence, the log odds or logit are equal to: 
g (x , P) = ln(P /(I - P)) = In 
7I(X) 
or, n(x) = 
- n ( x ) 
exp(Pn + P ,xi + + P icXk) 
= Po + P,x,+...+ Ptxl. 
]+exp(f30 + p,xi+-+PkXk) 
T h i s a p p e n d i x is b a s e d o n F e r n a n d e s ( 2 0 0 5 ) . 
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Furthermore, after the estimation of the vector o f t he parameters p0 + +. . .+ Pkxk50, it is 
necessary to map the vector for i = (n being the number of companies) to a [0,11 
space. In the rating system context, this space can be interpreted as the probability of 
default. The mapping function has the following form: 
F ( X ) p) = exP(/3o + /3lsi + - + / W 
l + e x p ( / 3 0 + . . . -1- /3^) ' 
Tests 
Statistical tests relevant for the particular logit regression model used in this thesis are 
described. Since there is only one independent variable in the logit regression model, tests 
for multicolinearity are not described. 
Significance of coefficients 
The Wald Chi-square test can be used for testing the statistical significance of the 
individual coefficients. The hypothesis H0 stands for/3, = 0 and the test statistic takes the 
following form: 
' ' I A A 
SE(f},)2 
and follows a Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. 
50 In the ra t ing s y s t e m con tex t , Hie va lue o f this vector is called the score o f a rating system. 
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The Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test is applied in order to check how effectively the 
estimated model describes the dependent variable. The predicted probabilities are divided 
into deciles (g = 10). Let 0 ° be the observed count of non-defaults for group / and 0J the 
observed count of defaults. Similarly, let p° be the predicted count of non-defaults for 
group / and p° the predicted count of defaults. The HL statistic then follows a Chi-square 
distribution with g - 2 degrees of freedom. 
The Box-Tidwell Test 
A logit regression will lack power if the assumption of linearity is violated. The 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables will be underestimated, so 
the Type II error will increase (assuming no relationship when there actually is). The Box-
Tidwell test consists of adding term xk ln(x t) to the regression model. If any of these cross-
product terms are significant then there is evidence of nonlinearity in the logit regression 
model. 
/=i P i P, 
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Appendix 451 
For the linear default increase rating system, the thresholds are set so that the number of 
expected defaul ts increases linearly from the best rating class to the worst. To achieve this 
goal, it is necessary to solve the two following equations: 
a*i = A, 
k 
1 4 = 1. 
where / represents the index of a rating class, A, is the percentage of all defaults in rating 
class i and k stands for the number of rating classes. 
When solving for a , we get: 
2 
a = . 
k*(k +1) 
Flence, for nine rating classes a is equal to: 
a = - = — = 0.0222. 
9* (9 +1) 45 
Therefore, the distribution of defaults over rating classes looks as represented on the 
following Table 21: 
51 Th i s a p p e n d i x is based on Schwaiger (2004) . 
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Table 21 
Percents of total defaults 
Rating class 1 2.22% 
Rating class 2 4.44% 
Rating class 3 6.66% 
Rating class 4 8.88% 
Rating class 5 11.10% 
Rating class 6 13.32% 
Rating class 7 15.54% 
Rating class 8 17.76% 
Rating class 9 19.98% 
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Appendix 5 
It is possible to apply the discrimination methodologies (CAP and ROC) directly to the 
Creditreform solvency index. By doing so, we can directly observe the discriminatory 
power o f t h e solvency index and compare it with that o f t h e rating systems set up in this 
thesis. T h e hypothesis is that by aggregating the indices into rating classes, lower 
discriminatory power is obtained. 
Since the two rating systems presented in this paper yield very similar results, the 
comparison will be carried out only between the Creditreform solvency index and the 
uniform distribution rating system. 
Cumulative accuracy profile (CAP) 
The C A P for the Creditreform solvency index is calculated the same way as for the uniform 
distribution rating system. The results are presented on Graph 16. 
However, there is no clear theoretical proof of the hypothesis of lower discriminatory 
power from aggregating obligors into rating classes. If the CAP of the Creditreform 
solvency index was concave everywhere along the curve, then it would be straight forward 
that the C A P curve o f t h e uniform distribution rating system would lie everywhere under 
the C A P curve o f t h e Creditreform solvency index. Thus, the CAP o f t h e rating system 
would mark a smaller area, leading to a lower accuracy ratio (AR) and lower discriminatory 
power. 
The problem is that the CAP curve of the Creditreform solvency index is not strictly 
concave. Hence, whether the AR o f t h e Creditreform solvency index is bigger or smaller 
than the AR of the rating system depends on the relative concavity / convexity of the 
Credi treform solvency index CAP curve. 
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Graph 16 
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The accuracy ratio o f t h e Creditreform solvency index is 39.11% whereas the AR o f t h e 
uniform distribution rating system is 37.42%, indicating slight loss of discriminatoiy 
power. Thus , the maximum discriminatory power one can achieve when calibrating rating 
classes is around 39.1 1%52. 
52 In a c c o r d a n c e vviih the discussion in the beginning o f t h e appendix, it is possible to set up a rating system 
so that it wou ld h a v e slightly higher discriminatory power than 39.11%. This is so due to the convexity o f t h e 
Cred i t r e fo rm s o l v e n c y index C A P curve in some parts along the curve. 
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Receiver Operat ing Characteristics (ROC) 
We can make the same analysis for the ROC, and the same discussion applies. The 
comparison is shown on Graph 17. 
Graph 17 
Receiver operating characteristics 
False alarm rate 
Creditreform index Random model Uniform distribution system 
The area under curve (AUC) for the whole Creditreform solvency index is 63.96% whereas 
the AUC for the uniform distribution rating system reaches 64.46%. As opposed to the 
accuracy ratio comparison, higher AUC for the rating system is obtained. 
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Testing for discriminative power53 
A simple test can be performed to access whether the Creditreform solvency index has any 
discriminative power at all. We test the hypothesis H0, stating that the Creditreform 
solvency index has no discriminative power based on the ROC measure, against the 
alternative hypothesis H,, stating that the Creditreform solvency index has discriminatory 
power. 
First, we need to define kernel uDND as: 
'D.ND 
l , i fS D >S N 
— if S =S , II oD oND , 
0, if SD<SND 
where SD represents a defaulter with Creditreform solvency index value equal to S, and SND 
stands for a non-defaulter with Creditreform solvency index value equal to S. 
Then the test statistics U is defined as: 
A 1 V 
U = — — 2 , U D . N D -
^ D ^ N D (D.ND) 
where the sum is over all pairs of defaulters and non-defaulters (D, ND) in the dataset and 
the numbers of defaulters and non-defaulters in the sample are respectively denoted by ND 
and NND respectively. 
53 For de ta i l s on this test see Enge lmann et al. (2003) . 
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For N U , N n d —»co, the term T = A U C U is asymptotically nomially distributed54 with 
mean zero and variance one and a 1 is given by: 
u 
p 2 _ N d + N n d + I 
Now, we are ready to test the hypothesis H0, stating that the Creditreform solvency index 
has no discriminatory power, i.e. AUC = 0.5 against the alternative hypothesis Hi, stating 
that the Creditreform solvency solvency index has discriminatory power, i.e. AUC * 0.5 . 
The results show that H0 can be dismissed, since the value o f T is -19.75, with the critical 
values for the standard normal distribution at 5% confidence level being -1.64 and 1.64. 
Flence, the Creditreform solvency index indeed has discriminatory power. 
54 Acco rd ing to E n g e l m a n n et al. (2003) , the number of defaults should be at least 50 to guarantee good 
approx ima t ion . T h e sample used in this thesis contains 1 587 defaults. 
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